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I. INTRODUCTION
In March 2004 and again in October 2005, tort reform
advocates and the food industry tasted a temporary victory when the
United States House of Representatives passed the Personal
Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, popularly titled the
"Cheeseburger Bill."' The purpose of the measure was to prevent
lawsuits against food manufacturers, marketers, distributors,
advertisers, sellers, and trade associations for alleged injuries or
1, See HR. Res. 339, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. Res. 554, 109th Cong. (2005); see
also Project Vote Smart, Food Industy Lawsuits-Passage Member Vote List, at http://
www. vote-smart.org/issuekeyvotemember.php?voteid=3375 (last visited Oct. 9,
2005),
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health conditions stemming from weight gain or obesity.2 However,
in both legislative sessions, the victory by tort reform advocates was
short-lived as the United States Senate allowed the Cheeseburger
Bill's companion measure, the Commonsense Consumption Act, to
die in committee.3 This defeat came as no surprise. The Senate had
previously blocked other House-passed measures intended to cap
legal damages and limit tort lawsuits against American industries.
4
Nevertheless, with current public opinion favoring the notion
that individuals should not be able to sue the food industry5 for their
2. H.R. Res. 339, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. Res. 554, 109th Cong. (2005).
3. S. Res. 1428, 108th Cong. (2003); S. Res. 908, 109th Cong. (2005).
4. Liza Porteus et al., House Passes "Cheeseburger Bill," FOXNews.com, Mar. 11,
2004, at http://www.foxnews.com/printer friendlystory/0,3566,113836,00.html (last
visited Oct. 9, 2005); see also Carl Hulse, Vote in House Offers a Shield In Obesity Suits,
The New York Times on the Web, Mar. 11, 2004, at http://www.wirestaurant.org/
news/obesity/67.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2005) (providing examples of Republican-
led House measures to give legal immunity to certain industries, such as gun
manufacturers and dealers, producers of a gasoline additive blamed for water
pollution, the tobacco industry, and producers of vaccines, that were ultimately
defeated in the Senate).
5. This Comment does not attempt to identify any particular member or group
of members of the food industry that might constitute proper defendants in lawsuits
seeking damages for obesity. However, it is acknowledged that such a determina-
tion is necessary for the suggested obesity lawsuits to be a viable option of enforcing
regulations imposed upon the food industry. Various authors and attorneys have
begun the process of identifying the proper members of the food industry from
which to seek damages for obesity. The plaintiffs attorney in the class action of
Barber v. McDonald's Corp. named the following defendants: McDonald's Corp.,
Burger King Corp., KFC Corp. d/b/a Kentucky Fried Chicken, and Wendy's
International, Inc. No. 23145/2002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx County filed July 26,
2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/mcdonalds/barbermcds72302
cmp.pdf [hereinafter Barber Complaint]. The plaintiffs attorney in Pelman v.
McDonald's Corp. named only McDonald's Corp. as the defendant. 237 F. Supp.
2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). One book uses the term "food industry" to refer to
companies that produce, process, manufacture, sell, and serve foods, beverages, and
dietary supplements. MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: How THE FOOD INDUSTRY
INFLUENCES NUTRITION AND HEALTH 11 (2002). In a larger sense, the term
encompasses all enterprises involved in the production and consumption of food
and beverages: producers and processors of food crops and animals (agribusiness);
companies that make and sell fertilizer, pesticides, seeds, and feed; those that
provide machinery, labor, real estate, and financial services to farmers; and others
that transport, store, distribute, export, process, and market foods after they leave
the farm. Id. In yet another sense, the food industry could be defined as the food
service sector-food carts, vending machines, restaurants, bars, fast-food outlets,
schools, hospitals, prisons, and workplaces-and associated suppliers of equipment
and serving materials. Id. Another approach might be to define "Big Food" as the
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obese condition,6 the battle over tort reform against the food
industry is far from over. In particular, state legislatures are
introducing measures that mirror the federal Cheeseburger Bill in
an attempt to reach the same results.7 With strong support from the
powerful food industry, such efforts have not been without success!
more high-profile members of the food industry such as: AFC Enter., Inc. (operates
Church's Chicken and Popeyes); Altamira Corp. (operates Arby's); Burger King
Corp.; Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc. (operates Rally's Burgers); Chick-il-A,
Inc.; Dairy Queen Corp.; Domino's Pizza, L.L.C.; Jack in the Box, Inc.; The Krystal
Co.; McDonald's Corp.; Papa John's Int'l, Inc.; Schlotzsky's, Inc.; Sonic Corp.;
Whataburger Corp.; Wendy's Int'l, Inc.; Yum! Brands, Inc. (operates Kentucky Fried
Chicken, Pizza Hut, Taco Bell, Long John Silvers, and A&W); Krispy Kreme, Inc.;
Coca-Cola Co.; and Pepsi Co. See Jeremy H. Rogers, Note, Living on the Fat of the
Land: How To Have Your Burger and Sue It Too, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 859, 861 n.17
(2003). One alternative might be to sue the members of major food industry
professional organizations such as the National Restaurant Association that serve as
representatives of the industry as a whole. See generally infra note 8. This Comment
contends that the main criteria for selecting the proper defendants should be to
target companies that prioritize the generation of profits first and foremost without
regard for the consequences of over-consumption of their products and do not take
an active role in preventing obesity among America's population.
6. H.R. Rep. No. 108-432, at 13 (2004), 2004 WL 409208 (2004) (citing Gallup
Poll, Analysis, Public Balks at Obesity Lawsuits, (July 21, 2003) (basing its results on
telephone interviews using a randomly selected national sample of 1,006 adults
(eighteen years and older), conducted July 7-9, 2003)).
7. National Conference of State Legislatures, 2003-2004 State Legislation on Civil
Immunity for Food Vendors, at http:/www.ncsl.org/programs/healthlFvmemo.htm (as
of October 1, 2004) (last visited Oct. 10, 2005). See Appendix A.
8. Representative Richard Anthony Keller (R. Fla.), the primary sponsor of H.R.
339 is well supported by the food industry. See Hulse, supra note 4 (listing the
National Restaurant Association and the National Federation of Independent
Businesses as backers of the bill). See also Michele Simon, Junk Food/Obesity Lawsuits
Alarm U.S. Food Giants (Apr. 1, 2004), at http:/www.organicconsumers.org/
foodsafety/obesity042004.cfm (last visited Oct. 9, 2005); James R. Carroll, Senator
Opposes Obesity Lawsuits, Courier-Journal.com (July 15, 2003) at http://www.courier-
journal.com/localnews/2003/07/15ky/wir-front-fatO715-7101.html (last visited Jan.
17, 2005) (stating that Rep. Keller's district includes the headquarters of the
company that owns the Red Lobster, Olive Garden, Bahama Breeze, and Smokey
Bones restaurant chains). Similarly, Senator McConnell (R. Ky.), the primary
sponsor of S. 1428, has received more than $200,000 in campaign contributions
from companies operating restaurants and bars, food processing companies, food
stores, and food and beverage firms, according to Federal Election Commission
records analyzed by the Center for Responsive Politics, a Washington-based group
that monitors political contributions and spending. See id. Among the
contributions were $5,000 from the National Restaurant Association, $2,000 from
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As of February 16, 2005, bills have been introduced in thirty-five
states and enacted in thirteen of those states.9
However, not all states are convinced that legislative action is
needed. Wisconsin Governor James E. Doyle, vetoed the state's
version of the bill in March 2004, and food vendor lawsuit immunity
legislation failed to pass in several states including California and
New Hampshire. l0 Still other states, such as Arkansas, have not yet
decided how to address the issues involved but have begun to
address the issue by taking the initial step of enacting measures to
study the problem of obesity.1
The Cheeseburger Bill legislation, at both the federal and state
levels, comes on the heels of two recent tort lawsuits filed in the State
of New York.12 In both cases, overweight individuals turned to the
courts to seek compensation for injuries caused by their obese
condition. 3 In addition to seeking compensation, some of the
plaintiffs hoped that successful tort claims against the food industry
would force the industry to take more responsibility for reducing the
prevalence of obesity in America.14
This comment contends that tort liability can complement
legislative and administrative government regulation of the food
industry, providing sellers and manufacturers of food with an incen-
tive to prevent consumers from over-consumption and becoming
obese. Specifically, this comment supports the proposition that after
government regulations are promulgated by Congress, claims should
be allowed by state attorneys general to recoup Medicaid costs
incurred in treating health conditions and illnesses caused by
obesity. 15 The legislature is the proper branch of our government to
determine the legislation and regulations needed to regulate the
McDonald's Corp., and $3,000 from Yum Brands, Inc., the parent company of KFC,
Taco Bell, Pizza Hut, A&W, and LongJohn Silver's. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Alyse Meislik, Note, Weighing In On the Scales of Justice: The Obesity Epidemic
and Litigation Against the Food Industry, 46 ARiz. L. REv. 781, 796 (2004) (referring to
an article detailing state study finding forty percent of Arkansas school children are
obese).
12. See Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d 512; Barber Complaint, supra note 5.
13. See generally Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d 512; Barber Complaint, supra note 5.
14. See generally Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d 512; Barber Complaint, supra note 5.
15. See Rogers, supra note 5, at 883 (proposing that states should be allowed to
sue fast food companies to recoup Medicaid costs incurred as a result of caring for
overweight and obese citizens).
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food industry, thus a thorough discussion of all possible measures to
regulate the food industry is beyond the scope of this paper.
Unlike the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA)'reached by
the states with the tobacco industry which has been described as
"largely toothless" in regulating the tobacco industry,' 7 the tort
system, by means of liability exposure, can discourage manufacturers
and sellers of food products from focusing solely on the generation
of profits and attempting to circumvent regulatory measures
authorized by Congress to govern the food industry. Tort liability
can provide the incentive needed for manufacturers and sellers of
food to take responsibility for the harm that over-consumption of
their products imposes on the scarce financial resources of the states'
Medicaid budgets.
II. OBESITY IS A NATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY CONCERN
The fiscal ramifications of obesity have thrust the issue onto the
public policy agenda, triggering a debate between those who view
obesity solely as a matter of personal responsibility and those who do
not.' 8 In 2001, the United States Surgeon General issued a "Call to
Action to Prevent and Decrease Overweight and Obesity,"1 9 thereby
bringing national attention to the issue of obesity. In this report, the
Surgeon General compared the health effects of obesity directly with
those caused by smoking cigarettes. 20 According to Roland Strum,
16. See infra Section IV.A.
17. Alan E. Scott, The Continuing Tobacco War: State and Local Tobacco Control In
Washington, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1097, 1104 (2000); Robert L. Kline, Tobacco
Advertising After the Settlement: Where We Are and What Remains To Be Done, 9 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 621, 634 (Summer 2000).
18. See generally Lou Marano, Is Obesity a U.S. Public Policy Issue, United Press
International, May 14, 2003, available at http:www.upi.conVview.cfm?StorylD=
20030513-101626-5081r (interviewing Shannon Brownlee, Senior Fellow at the New
America Foundation). For additional information, visit the website of George
Washington School of Law Professor John F. Banzhaf III at http://banzhaf.net (last
visited Oct. 9, 2005).
19. United States Dep't of Health & Human Services (DHHS), The Surgeon
General's Call to Action to Prevent and Decrease Overweight and Obesity (2001), available at
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/obesity.
20. Id. Though the original Centers for Disease Control (CDC) report estimated
the number of deaths linked to overweight and obesity to be about 400,000 per
year, in a letter and correction published in the Journal of the American Medical
Association, CDC has since reduced its estimate to about 365,000 per year. See
Betsy McKay, CDC Cuts Estimate of Deaths From Obesity, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2005, at
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the health economist who conducted the study giving rise to the
Surgeon General's report, "[o]besity appears to have a stronger
association with the occurrence of chronic medical conditions,
reduced health-related quality of life, and increased health care and
medication spending than smoking or problem drinking.,
21
A. The Statistics of Obesity
22
Being overweight or obese is an epidemic among Americans.
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) determines whether persons
are overweight or obese by calculating their body mass index
(BMI).23 The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) estimates that 64%,
or approximately two out of three American adults, are either over-
weight or obese.24 NIH estimates the number to be ninety-seven
million Americans. 25 In 1991, only four of forty-five states partici-
D7, 2005 WL-WSJ 59838170. Nonetheless, this correction does not change the fact
that obesity is the second leading cause of preventable death. Id.
21. Jonathan S. Goldman, Comment, Take That Tobacco Settlement and Super-Size
It!: The Deep-Frying of the Fast Food Industry?, 13 TEMP. POL. & Crv. RTS. L. REV. 113,
129 (2003) available at http:/Aww.surgeongeneral.gov/news/pressreleases/pr -
obesity.htm) (citing Press Release, DHHS, Overweight and Obesity Threaten U.S.
Health Gains (Dec. 13, 2001)).
22. See Rogers, supra note 5, at 862 (citing David Satcher, DHHS, Foreword to Call
To Action To Prevent and Decrease Overweight and Obesity, available at
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/obesity/calltoaction/foreward.htm); Ali H.
Mokdad et al., The Spread of the Obesity Epidemic in the United States, 1991-1998, 282J.
AM. MED. AsS'N 1519 (1999); Overweight, Obesity Threaten U.S. Health Gains, FDA
CONSUMER, Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 8); see also Goldman, supra note 21, at 129.
23. Rogers, supra note 5, at 863 (citing NIH, Clinical Guidelines on the Identification,
Evaluation, and Treatment of Overweight and Obesity in Adults: The Evidence Report, NIH
Publication No. 98-4083 at xiv, available at http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/guidelines/
obesity/obgdlns.pdf) [hereinafter Clinical Guidelines]). BMI is calculated as:
[[weight (in pounds) / height (in inches) x 2] x 703]. Id. BMI is categorized as
follows: Underweight (BMI < 18.5); Normal Weight (BMI = 18.5 - 24.9);
Overweight (BMI = 25.0 - 29.9); Obesity I (BMI = 30.0 - 34.9); Obesity II (BMI =
35.0 - 39.9); Obesity III [Morbid Obesity] (BMI = 40). Id.
24. Richard H. Carmona, United States Surgeon General, Statement on His
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Competition, Infrastructure, and Foreign
Commerce, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the United
States Senate, available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/news/testimony/child
obesity03O22004.htm. See also CDC, REPORT ON OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY-
DEFINING OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/
obesity/defining.htm.
25. Rogers, supra note 5, at 862 (citing Clinical Guidelines, supra note 23, at vii).
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pating in a survey conducted by CDC had obesity prevalence rates26
of 15-19% and no state had a prevalence rate greater than 20% of its
population.27 In 2001, twenty states had obesity prevalence rates of
15%-19%; twenty-nine states had prevalence rates of 20-24%; and
one state reported a prevalence rate of more than 25%.28 As a result,
obesity has been recognized as a disease by NIH, the National
Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine, the Federal Trade
Commission, the Maternal and Child Health Bureau, the World
Health Organization, the American Heart Association, the American
Academy of Family Physicians, and the American Society of Bariatric
Physicians.29
Most recently, in July 2004, the Secretary of DHHS, announced
that Medicare was removing language in its Coverage Policy Manual
indicating that "obesity is not an illness." 30 This language had pre-
viously meant that no payments could be made for obesity treatment
because, by statute, Medicare only pays for the treatment of illnesses
and accidents.31 The DHHS policy change indicates that Medicare
will now 3pay for treatments of obesity which are reasonable and
effective. Effectiveness of treatments will be decided by the
established Medicare process.
33
The Medicare Coverage Advisory Committee (MCAC) held a
hearing on November 4, 2004, to review Medicare's Coverage Policy
Manual which approves gastric bypass surgery when used for
treating diseases caused by obesity.3  MCAC was persuaded that
surgeons should follow the 1991 NIH Consensus Conference
protocol, which provides surgery to persons with a BMI greater than
26. CDC, REPORT ON OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY-1991-2001 PREVALENCE OF




29. Rogers, supra note 5, at 863 n.30.
30. AOA, Treatment: Medicare and Obesity: Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.
obesity.org/treatment/medicarefaq.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2005). DHHS did not
definitively say obesity is a disease, rather, it removed the language which said
"obesity is not a disease," and added language that Medicare would pay for




34. AOA, supra note 30.
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forty, and persons with a BMI greater than thirty-five with comorbid
conditions.3
It is now the task of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) to make national coverage determinations (NCDs)
which will provide what will be covered under the national rules for
Medicare.3 The American Society of Bariatric Surgery (ASBS) is
preparing to ask CMS for a new NCD based on the strong support
for surgery expressed at the November 4, 2004 hearings.37 The
American Obesity Association (AOA) is considering filing a petition
with CMS to cover physician counseling and services incident to
physician services consistent with the existing Medicare program.38
In addition, AOA is planning a return to Congress to seek the
inclusion of drugs to treat obesity in the Medicare pharmaceutical
benefit NCD. 39  The American Dietetic Association (ADA) is
contemplatinj what to do regarding the Medical Nutrition Therapy
benefit NCD.
Historically, what Medicare decides to cover is also selected for
coverage by the federal-state Medicaid program and by private,
commercial insurance providers.4 ' By removing the language from
the Coverage Policy Manual, Medicare officials have "opened the
door almost as far as they can go. Everything now is a techni-
cality."42 A decision to cover obesity treatments under Medicaid
could create the possibility for state attorneys general to recoup costs
for treating obesity-related illnesses from the food industry.43
When Congress first enacted Medicaid by passing the State
Plans for Medical Assistance Act, the statute provided that partici-
pating states must include in their administration plan a procedure
for recovering funds from third parties liable for the injuries of





39. AOA, supra note 30.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Marguerite Higgins, Obesity Policy Will Benefit Trial Lawyers, WASH. TIMES, July
17, 2004, available at http://washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StoryID
=20040716-114333-6943r (quoting Professor Banzhaf).
43. Id.
44. Cliff Sherrill, Comment, Tobacco Litigation: Medicaid Third Party Liability and
Claims for Restitution, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 497, 501 (1997) (citing 42
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discretion of the states, and the administration plan adopted by the
participating state must include proper recovery procedures.45
B. The Costs of Obesity
According to a study of national costs attributed to obesity,
direct medical expenses accounted for 9.1% of the total United
States medical expenditures in 1998, an amount estimated to be as
high as $78 billion.46 Further, the National Governors Association
(NGA) estimates that the nation spends $56 billion on indirect costs
related to obesity.47 The burden of paying these expenses fell
squarely on American taxpayers, as approximately half of these costs
were paid by Medicaid and Medicare. Obesity is now estimated to
cost our society approximately $117 billion in direct and indirect
costs, second only to the costs associated with tobacco use.
49
A 2004 study focused on state-level estimates of total Medicare
and Medicaid medical expenditures attributable to obesity.5" State-
level estimates ranged from $87 million in Wyoming to $7.7 billion
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25) (1996)). The state's administration plan must take all
"reasonable measures to ascertain the legal liability of third parties." Id. at 501
n.35.
[I]n any case where such a legal liability is found to exist after medical
assistance has been made available on behalf of the individual and where
the amount of reimbursement the State can reasonably expect to recover
exceeds the cost of such recovery, the State... will seek reimbursement for
such assistance to the extent of such legal liability .... Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a (a)(25)(B) (1996)).
45. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25) (1996); Health Care Financing
Administration State Fiscal Administration Rule, 42 C.F.R. § 433.138 (1996)).
46. CDC, REPORT ON OVERWEIGHT AND OBEsITY-ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/economic-consequences.htm
[hereinafter ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES] (citing a 2003 study by Finkelstein,
Fiebelkorn, and Wang).
47. Rogers, supra note 5, at 867 (citing NGA, NGA Highlights States Efforts to
Combat Obesity, available at http://www.nga.org/nga/newsroom/1,1169,C_PRESS_
RELEASE;D_3995,00.html).
48. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES, supra note 46.
49. Carmona, supra note 24. "Direct costs" include preventive, diagnostic, and
treatment services related to obesity. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES, supra note 46.
"Indirect costs" relate to morbidity and mortality costs. Id. "Morbidity costs" are
defined as the value of income lost from decreased productivity, restricted activity,
absenteeism, and bed days, whereas "mortality costs" are the value of future income
lost by premature death. Id.
50. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES, supra note 46.
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in California.5' Medicare expenditure estimates attributable to
obesity range from $15 million in Wyoming to $1.7 billion in
California, and Medicaid expenditure estimates attributable to
obesity range from $23 million in Wyoming to $3.5 billion in New
York.5
Research studies have shown that obesity increases the risk of
developing numerous health complications including type 2
diabetes, hypertension, coronary heart disease, ischemic stroke,
colon cancer, post-menopausal breast cancer, endometrial cancer,
53gall bladder disease, osteoarthritis, and obstructive sleep apnea.
Further, adults who are overweight are considered to be at a greater
risk for disability and premature death.54
It is estimated that more than nine million children-one in
every seven children-are at increased risk of weight-related chronic
diseases.55  Pediatricians are diagnosing a greater number of
children with type 2 diabetes, formerly known as adult-onset
diabetes, and research indicates that one-third of all children born in
2000 will develop type 2 diabetes during their lifetime. 6 These
statistics are alarming because complications are likely to appear
much earlier in life for those who develop type 2 diabetes in
childhood or adolescence, and people with type 2 diabetes are at an
increased risk of developing heart disease, stroke, kidney disease,
and blindness.5 7
Thus, health problems associated with obesity clearly have a
significant economic impact on the economy of the United States. It
is equally clear that these costs are only going to increase. The issue
of who is going to pay for these costs is what is at stake in the current
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C. Obesity is a Public Policy Issue Requiring Government
and Judicial Intervention
Prevention of obesity has been an explicit goal of our national
public health policy since 1980.58 Although public policy regarding
obesity has historically been assigned to DHHS, the implementation
of obesity objectives has been distributed among several different
agencies within DHHS, with no single agency taking lead
responsibility.
59
CDC was to encourage the adoption of a model school criteria,
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) was to develop a mass-
media campaign to educate the public about food labels, and NIH
was to sponsor workshops and research obesity. 6°  Further, in
response to increasing obesity in America, the United States Public
Health Service (PHS) developed successive ten-year plans to reduce
behavioral risks for obesity through specific and measurable health
objectives. However, while the various agencies continue to
encourage and publicize, their efforts to achieve national obesity
objectives have been curbed due to lack of sufficient funds.62
Nevertheless, obesity among American citizens may have little to
do with failed government efforts.63 Rather, it may be due to the
capitalistic economics of our nation's food system.64 In a competitive
marketplace, food companies must meet shareholder demands for
profits by encouraging more people to consume their products.65
58. Marion Nestle & Michael F. Jacobson, Halting the Obesity Epidemic: A Public
Health Policy Approach, 115 PUB. HEALTH REPORTS 12, 15 (Jan./Feb. 2000) (citing
DHHS, Promoting Health/Preventing Disease: Objectives for the Nation, Washington:
Government Printing Office (1980)).
59. Id. (citing DHHS, Promoting Health/Preventing Disease: Public Health Service
Implementation Plans for Attaining the Objectives for the Nation, PUB. HEALTH REPORT
SuPP. (Sept./Oct. 1983)).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 15-16 (citing DHHS, Healthy People 2000: National Health Promotion and
Disease Prevention Objectives, Washington: Government Printing Office (1990);
United States Department of Health and Human Services, Healthy People 2010:
Understanding and Improving Health, Washington: Government Printing Office
(2000)).
62. NESTLE, supra note 5, at 22.
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On an annual basis, the food industry spends approximately
$33 billion on direct and indirect media advertisements.66 In 1999,
McDonald's spent $627.2 million, Burger King $403.6 million, Taco
Bell $206.5 million, and Coca-Cola $174.4 million on advertising.67
Such figures dwarf the $300 million that the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture spends annually on nutrition education, 6r the
National Cancer Institute's $1 million annual investment to increase
consumption of fruit and vegetables, 69 and the $1.5 million dollar
budget of the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute's National
Cholesterol Education Campaign.7 °
The economics of food industry spending in relation to
government spending on problems related to obesity are not
functioning on an equal basis. The food industry receives an
enormous part of our country's economic resources;71 however, those
funds are not being used to counter the negative impact that over-
consumption of the food industry's products has on our society.
III. SOCIAL TORT LITIGATION AGAINST THE FOOD INDUSTRY
A. Social Tort Litigation
An emerging trend is the use of mass tort litigation to regulate
corporate behavior. 72 The social impact of law is a legal research
inquiry that was first suggested in 1915 by Roscoe Pound in his
66. Id. at 22. See also Nestle & Jacobson, supra note 58, at 18 (citing A.E. Gallo,
The Food Marketing System in 1996, AGRIL. INFO. BULL. No. 743, Washington: United
States Department of Agriculture (1998)).
67. NESTLE, supra note 5, at 22.
68. Id.
69. Nestle & Jacobson, supra note 58, at 18 (citing Government and Industry Launch
Fruit and Vegetable Push, But NCI Takes Back Seat, 22.26 Nutrition Week 1,2 (1992)).
70. Id. (citing Lenfant C. Cleeman II, The National Cholesterol Education Program:
Progress and Prospects, 280.20 J. Am. MED. ASS'N 99-104 (1998)).
71. The American public spends more than $110 billion annually purchasing
food industry products. ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION: THE DARK SIDE OF
THE ALL-AMERICAN MEAL 3 (2002). Other estimates are as high as $800 billion.
NESTLE, supra note 5, at 11.
72. See generally Michael L. Rustad, Smoke Signals from Private Attorneys General in
Mega Social Policy Cases, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 511 (2001); Francis E. McGovern, Class
Actions and Social Issue Torts in the Gulf South, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1655 (2000); Richard P.
Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, The Tobacco Litigation,
and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1859 (2000).
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theory of social interests in the law.73 The modern trend of
regulation by litigation first arose during state Medicaid recoupment
lawsuits against the tobacco industry.74
During the tobacco litigation, trial courts deviated from tradi-
tional legal principles in order to allow state governments to achieve
their public policy goals through litigation.75 The tobacco litigation
reallocated the financial burden of caring for tobacco users, and
increased the accountability of the tobacco industry in its marketing
76 Sca opractices. Social policy tort lawsuits serve the public interest in
three ways. First, they reallocate the burden of caring for consumers
harmed by industries profiting from such consumers. Second, such
actions increase the accountability of such industries. Third, they
help to eliminate defective products and corporate practices.77
B. Comparing Potential Litigation Against the Food Industry With
Litigation Against the Tobacco Industry
In evaluating the future viability of the obesity lawsuits in
forcing the food industry to take a more active role in preventing
obesity, obesity litigation should be compared with the litigation that
devastated the tobacco industry and ultimately resulted in the
tobacco industry's MSA.7' Litigation against the tobacco industry
may have expanded the field of products liability.79 Similar to the
cases against the tobacco manufacturers, the likelihood of success
against food companies would significantly increase if hidden
manufacturing or marketing strategies are discovered through
73. Rustad, supra note 72, at 514 (citing Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality, 28
HARv. L. REV. 343 (1915)). Professor Rustad was Of Counsel for the Amicus Curiae
Brief of the Coalition for Consumer Rights and University Scholars and Law
Professors in Illinois v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 759 N.E.2d 906 (Ill. 2001). Id. at n.al.
74. Id. at511-12.
75. Victor E. Schwartz, The Remoteness Doctrine: A Rational Limit on Tort Law, 8
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 421 (1999). States passed legislation to facilitate their
victory in court. See FLA. STAT. § 409.910 (1997); 1998 Vt. Acts & Resolves 142
(codified in part at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 1904, 1911 (1998); MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. I § 15-120 (West 1998). See generally Robert A. Levy, Tobacco Medicaid
Litigation: Snuffing Out the Rule of Law, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 601 (1998).
76. Schwartz, supra note 75, at 421.
77. Rustad, supra note 72, at 514.
78. See infra Section IV.A.
79. Meislik, supra note 11, at 801-02.
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industry whistleblowers or the discovery process.80 While it cannot
be predicted at this time whether the states would be victorious in
litigation against the food industry, it would be unwise for the food
industry to underestimate the possibility of such litigation.81
1. Similarities Between Litigation Against the Food Industry
and Litigation Against the Tobacco Industry
There are several similarities between litigation against the
tobacco industry and litigation against the food industry. The same
lawyers who successfully engineered the litigation against the tobacco
companies are also the lawyers supporting litigation against the food
industry. 2 The starting point for both movements is also the same. 3
In 1964, United States Surgeon General Luther L, Terry began the
anti-smoking movement by calling cigarette smoking a "health
hazard of sufficient importance in the United States to warrant
appropriate remedial action. " Similarly, in 2001, Surgeon General
David Satcher issued a "Call to Action" against obesity,85 and since
that declaration the fight against obesity has continued to grow
throughout the United States. 6 Further, the advertising campaigns
used by both industries are very similar.
8 7
80. Id. at 802.
81. See id. (citing Laura Bradford, Fat Foods: Back in Court: Novel Theories Revive
the Case Against McDonald's-and Spur Other Big Firms To Slim Down Their Menus,
TIME ONLINE EDITION, Aug. 3, 2003, at http://www.time.com/time/insidebiz/article/
0,9171,1101030811-472858,00.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2005)). David Adelman, a
consumer-food analyst at Morgan Stanley who covered the tobacco industry
litigation contends "[ilt would be a mistake to underestimate the creativity of
plaintiffs' lawyers." Meislik, supra note 11, At 802 n.214.
82. Id. at 802 (citing John Alan Cohan, Obesity, Public Policy, and Tort Claims
Against Fast-Food Companies, 12 WIDENER L.J. 103, 110 (2003) ("Lawyers who




85. See supra Section II.
86. Meislik, supra note 11, at 802.
87. Id. at 804.
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2. Differences Between Litigation Against the Food Industry
and Litigation Against the Tobacco Industry
Unlike the tobacco industry, it has not been established that the
food industry preyed on unknowing consumers, so the food industry
may lack the "diabolical reputation associated with tobacco manufac-
turers., 88 Even so, supporters of litigation against the food industry
are slowly working to eliminate this difference.8 9 In cases against the
tobacco companies, plaintiffs discovered documents revealing that
the tobacco industry "had prior knowledge of the dangers of tobacco
[and there had been] a long pattern of concealment, denial, and
even manipulation of the addictive component of tobacco."90
Further, evidence obtained in the tobacco industry litigation
revealed that the tobacco industry intentionally sought to addict
young consumers in order to ensure lifelong customers. 91
Unlike the tobacco manufacturers, there is no evidence that
food companies intentionally increased the addictive nature of their
products or intentionally misled consumers about the dangers of
their products.92 Further, those who oppose litigation against the
food industry contend that food is not addictive like nicotine, and
even if some foods are discovered to be addictive, the addictive
effects are not as harmful as the addictive effect of nicotine.93
However, without first being allowed to complete the discovery
process, it is impossible to know exactly what the food companies
know about their products or do to make their products more
dangerous.94 Meanwhile, researchers are investigating whether food
is addictive and can trigger cravings similar to drug addictions. 95
The Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine (PCRM) claims
there is biochemical evidence that the craving of unhealthy foods
88. Id. (citing Franklin E. Crawford, Note, Fit for Its Ordinary Purpose? Tobacco,
Fast Food, and the Implied Warranty of Merchantability, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1165, 1219
(2002)).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 804-05 (quoting Jonathan Turley, A Crisis of Faith: Tobacco and the
Madisonian Democracy, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 433, 447 (2000)).
91. Meislik, supra note 11, at 805 (citing Crawford, supra note 88, at 1219).
92. Id.
93. Id. (citing Crawford, supra note 88, at 1219-20).
94. Id.
95. Id. (citing Crawford, supra note 88, at 1219-20); Forrest Lee Andrews,
Comment, Small Bites: Obesity Lawsuits Prepare To Take On the Fast Food Industry, 15
ALB. L.J. Sci. &TECH. 153, 164-66 (2004)).
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originates more from a physical addiction to those foods than from a
lack of willpower.96 PCRM asserts that researchers have found
certain foods are "seductive foods"-foods that are "similar to drugs
in that they cause the release of opiate-like compounds that
stimulate the brain's pleasure center."97
Another difference is that food is essential and we cannot live
without it; however, people can live without tobacco. Food has
health benefits, but "there is no such thing as a healthy diet of
smoking or smoking in moderation."" In addition, unlike tobacco
users who tend to be loyal to particular brands, it will be difficult to
prove causation for liability purposes among food addicts because
they tend to eat unhealthy products from a variety of sources. 99
Causation also becomes difficult because people who eat unhealthy
foods at restaurants also may eat poorly at home. 1"°
C. Primary Limitation of Litigation Against the Food Industry:
The Enigma of Causation
With adverse case law and an industry that appears to be acting
responsibly, state attorneys general seeking to hold the food industry
liable for obesity must confront several obstacles. First, employing a
class action lawsuit to force defendant food companies to choose the
cheaper route of settlement over costly litigation requires the crea-
tion of a suitable class. Second, even if enough plaintiffs are found
so as to allow for the creation of a class, the fatal flaws of traditional
causes of action still exist.
In order to successfully mount a class action, the plaintiff class
bears the burden of proving causation. While scientific evidence
satisfactorily establishes that obesity results from consumption of
calories in excess of that used as energy by the body, prevention of
obesity requires individuals to balance the calories they consume
with the calories they burn through metabolic and muscular
96. Meislik, supra note 11, at 805 (citing Press Release, PCRM, Nutrition Expert
Provides New Ammunition for Fast-Food Lawsuits (June 3, 2003), available at
http://www.pcrm.org/news/health03O6O3.html).
97. Id. at 806 (citing Press Release, PCRM, Health Advocates Condemn Proposed
Bill to Shield Junk Food Industry (June 16, 2003), available at http://www.pcrm.org/
news/health030616.html).
98. Id. at 808 (citing Bradford, supra note 81).
99. See id.; see also infra Section 11I.D.
100. See infra Section III.D.
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activity.' O' Nevertheless, the precise relationship between the diet
and activity in order to prevent obesity is still being researched.' 02
In April 2003, at a scientific conference of the Federation of
American Societies for Experimental Biology, findings were pre-
sented which demonstrated that over the past twenty years, teen-
agers have, on average, increased their caloric intake by 1%.103 The
report also showed that during that same period, the percentage of
teenagers who said they engaged in some physical activity for at least
thirty minutes a day dropped from 42% to 29%.'0 4 If these findings
are true, then the drop in physical activity might be the major factor
causing increased obesity in this country. Nevertheless, there is
scientific evidence supporting the counter-argument that the level of
energy-expending activities that Americans engage in has remained
relatively constant.'0 5 Under this premise, the gap leaves over-
consumption of food products as the most probable cause of
excessive weight gain.' °6
Currently, in the context of traditional causes of action against
the food industry, the primary bar to successful litigation is the
legally required consideration of the number of other factors which
could have contributed in producing the harm and the extent of the
effect which such factors have in producing the harm. 07 A second
consideration is whether a particular food company has created a
force or series of forces which is in continuous and active operation
up to the time of the harm.'0 8
Even if food industry practices play a role in obesity, surely
other factors such as genetics, inactivity, and cultural differences do
101. NESTLE, supra note 5, at 8.
102. Nestle & Jacobson, supra note 58, at 12 (citing United States Preventative
Services Task Force, Guide to Clinical Preventative Services, 2d ed. Alexandria (VA):
International Medical Publishing (1996); S. Dalton, Overweight and Weight
Management, Gaithersburg (MD): Aspen Publishing (1997)).
103. H.R. Rep. No. 108-432, at 10.
104. Id.
105. Rogers, supra note 5, at 881 (citing Mokdad et al., supra note 22, at 1521
("[Olur data demonstrate that a major contributor to obesity-physical inactivity-
has not changed substantively at the population level between 1991 and 1998").
"[S]urveys do not report enough of a decrease in activity levels to account for the
current rising rates of obesity." See NESTLE, supra note 5, at 8.
106. NESTLE, supra note 5, at 8.
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 433 (1965).
108, Id.
[VOL. 1 :433
DEFINING THE PROPER ROLE FOR THE TORT SYSTEM
as well. 1°9 Nonetheless, despite these many obstacles, the ingenuity
of the American legal system to create legal theories in order to
fairly distribute tort costs should not be dismissed.
D. Eliminating Proof of Specific Causation Against Any Single Food
Industry Company or Product
Under current law, regardless of the theory under which the
action is brought, ° plaintiffs must prove that a particular food
company or product caused the obesity for which they claim
damages."' Causation is the central, decisive factor in mass tort
litigation.11 2  To understand why the causation requirement is
detrimental in litigation against the food industry, an understanding
of how causation is proved is essential.
In ordinary products liability cases, a plaintiff explains the
causal link that produced the plaintiffs injury." 3 Similarly, in toxic
tort cases, proof of causation against any specific food industry
company or product is extremely difficult to show for obvious
reasons. Generally, exposure to a single food company or food
product is not a necessary cause of obesity. 114 In the case of obesity,
it would be almost impossible to prove that an individual's obesity is
109. Scott M. Grundy, Multifactorial Causation of Obesity: Implications for Prevention,
67 AM.J. CLINICAL NUTR. 563S, 566S-67S (1998).
110. Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory
offustice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2117, 2120 (1997) (stating that plaintiffs
can rely on a variety of legal theories including strict liability, negligence, design
defect, failure to warn, and nuisance).
111. Id. (citing Richard A. Nagareda, In the Aftermath of the Mass Tort Class Action, 85
GEO. L.J. 295, 317 n.100 (1996) ("In contrast to the variations in state tort law on
other questions, there is no reason to believe that any jurisdiction deviates from the
requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate general causation.")).
112. Id. (citing JUDGE JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT
LITIGATION 148 (1995) ("The only real liability issue becomes causation: was this
manufacturer's product a substantial cause of this plaintiffs medical problems-
however we define them?")).
113. Grundy, supra note 109, at 566S-67S.
114. Berger, supra note 110, at 2121. Of course, tort law requires only a but-for
cause, not a necessary cause, in order to establish liability. Id. at 2121 n.15. It is
easier, however, to prove a but-for cause when the defendant's product is necessarily
implicated in plaintiffs harm. Id. Establishing a but-for relationship is also not
problematic when the plaintiff suffers from harm that is uniquely or almost always
caused by exposure to a defendant's product. Id.
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attributable to a particular food product or company."l 5 Plaintiffs
must therefore produce sufficient scientific evidence which
establishes a probability-based inference that the food product in
question was capable of causing the obesity in question (i.e., general
causation). After establishing general causation, the plaintiff must
then establish that the exposure to the defendant's product was the
specific cause of the obesity (i.e. specific causation). 1 6  In many
instances of toxic tort litigation, the factfinder must determine the
sufficiency of causation even though the causal mechanism is not
fully understood.' 17 Nonetheless, it is the responsibility of the finder
of fact to determine the sufficiency of causation."'
In the context of a single company or product being found
liable for obesity, it is unlikely that any sufficient statistical
association between that particular company or product and the
plaintiffs obesity can be sufficiently demonstrated to compel a court
to concede a causal connection.1 9 In the case of obesity, it would be
nearly impossible for a plaintiff to produce sufficient scientific
evidence from which a probability-based inference could be drawn
that a particular food company or product caused the plaintiffs
obesity.'2
115. Id. at 2122 (citing David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure
Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 859-60 (1984)
for the proposition that liability should be imposed in proportion to the probability
of causation attributable to the substance in issue, whether or not the probability is
above or below 50%).
116. Berger, supra note 110, at 2122 (citing Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. V.
United States Mineral Prod., 52 F.3d 1124, 1131 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Causation in toxic
torts normally comprises two separate inquiries: whether the epidemiological or
other scientific evidence establishes a causal link between [x and y], and whether
plaintiff is within the class of persons to which inferences from the general causation
evidence should be applied." [citations omitted])). "Plaintiffs typically prove
specific causation by calling a physician to testify that a differential diagnosis (as
opposed to introducing affirmative evidence of causation) of plaintiff revealed no
other explanation for plaintiff's disease." Id. at 2122 n. 18.
117. Id. at 2121 n.15. For a discussion of necessary and sufficient causes see id.
(citing Sorell L. Schwartz, An Overall Conceptual Approach to the Problem of Causation, 3
SHEPARD'S EXPERT & Sci. EVIDENCE Q. 1 (1995)).
118. Id.
119. Berger, supra note 110, at 2121.
120. Grundy, supra note 109, at 566S-567S. As discussed above, obesity may result
from the interaction of multiple factors including genetic susceptibility,
environmental factors, and other company's food products. See supra note 115 and
accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, for the purpose of lawsuits brought by state
attorneys general against the food industry as a whole, courts should
be willing to concede the causal connection between obesity and the
food products manufactured and sold by the food industry. In the
case of "signature diseases," the sufficiency of the statistical associa-
tion between the product and a particular harm is so compelling that
courts and scientists are willing to concede a causal connection. 12'
Courts have been willing to ascribe causation in cases of a signature
disease because the number of persons who will be compensated
undeservedly is low, and because denying meritorious compensation
to the injured would be unfair to so many. 22 The consequence is
that the food industry will be liable provided plaintiffs can prove a
sufficient exposure to products manufactured and sold by the food
industry.1
2 1
Because causation would be an essential element of food
industry liability, scientific proof against the food industry must meet
the two prong test set forth in the United States Su reme Court
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. First, the
evidence must be scientifically valid, meaning it is derived from
scientific practices that are methodologically sound. 25 Second, the
expert's evidence must fit the facts of the case, or in other words be
relevant. 26 In various toxic tort cases, plaintiffs have traditionally
relied on four different types of scientific evidence to prove
causation: (1) structure-activity analysis; (2) in vitro analysis; (3) in
vivo analysis; and (4) epidemiological analysis. 27 However, none of
these forms of scientific evidence can conclusively prove a cause and
121. Berger, supra note 110, at 2121. Although some would restrict the term
"signature disease" to a disease that is associated uniquely with exposure to a
particular agent, lawyers often use the term to refer to a disease that is "caused
almost exclusively" by a particular exposure. Id. (citing Linda A. Bailey et al.,
Reference Guide on Epidemiology, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 121,
177 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. Ed., 1994); Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and
Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REV. 845, 859-60
n.38 (1987)).
122. Berger, supra note 110, at 2121 n.16.
123. Id.
124. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
125. Berger, supra note 110, at 2122-23 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590).
126. See generally id. at 2123 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591).
127. Id. (citing Susan R. Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts: Is There a Rational Solution
to the Problem of Causation?, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 189, 217-26 (1992)).
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effect relationship between a plaintiff's health condition and a
plaintiffs exposure to a defendant's product.
2 1
Perhaps the only realistic way to overcome the causation barrier
is through a modification in the specific causation requirement for
Medicaid recoupment suits against the food industry. Similar
modifications have previously occurred with respect to toxic tort
cases as some legal commentators have used the difficulty of jurors
in properly assessing the aforementioned uncertainty as a basis for
modifying the causation requirement in toxic tort cases.
129
Similar to obesity cases against the food industry, toxic tort cases
run contrary to the rationale of requiring proof of specific causation
and the view that specific causation is key to determining the link
between the act and the resulting harm. 130 The plaintiffs in toxic tort
cases cannot be determined in advance of a harm, the causes of
injury are frequently not known or cannot be precisely determined
by scientific methods, and the lapse of time between the act and the
harm caused creates an incentive for people to avoid an act whose
adverse consequences may not manifest until many years later."I
The characteristics of toxic torts, as well as cases linking obesity to a
particular company or product, mesh poorly with the notion of
corrective justice that actors should be liable only for irresponsible
choices that are foreseeable.'
32
"[C]ausation is often fortuitous and thus morally arbitrary. To
erect sharp disparities of treatment on such a foundation violates the
requirement of equal treatment implied by the conception of equal
dignity and respect. '133 From this perspective, it has been proposed
that in order to minimize the risks to society caused by uncertainty
and inconclusive proof of causation, tort law should focus on
creating a standard of care regarding a corporation's duty to keep
itself informed about the risks of its products.' As a result,
128. Id. at 2123-29.
129. Id. at 2130, 2131-32.
130. Berger, supra note 110, at 2132.
131. See id. at 2132-33.
132. Id. at 2133.
133. Id. at 2134 (quoting Christopher H. Schroeder, Causation, Compensation,
and Moral Responsibility, in Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law 347, 348 n.1
(David G. Owen ed., 1995); Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability
for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439, 439 (1990)).
134. Id.
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[i]f a corporation fails to exercise the appropriate level of due
care, it should be held liable to those put at risk by its action,
without regard to injuries that eventually ensue; it is culpable
because it has acted without taking into account the interests of
those who will be affected by its conduct.
35
Arguably, current law encourages corporations to engage in
behavior that keeps them from investigating the risks caused by their
products because the future likelihood that a causal connection can
be proven between the corporation's acts and a plaintiffs harm is
perceived as minimal when compared to the cost of present
compliance. 136 Uncertainty about the future with respect to proof of
causation, coupled with the lapse of time before definitive harm will
emerge, usually creates incentives for management of a corporation
to decide in favor of maximizing short-term objectives. 137 To compel
corporations to obtain earlier and better information about the
potential adverse health effects of their food products, such
companies must be convinced that it is in their best interest not to
suppress unfavorable research results or other data showing the
adverse health effects brought about by their food products.
38
One way to accomplish this goal is to impose liability in
negligence for failure to provide substantial information relating to
the potential risks of a company's product, and to eliminate the
requirement of proving specific causation. 139  Under this model,
once a plaintiff proves the defendant's negligence in failing to reveal
substantial information relevant to assessing the potential risks of
exposure, a prima facie case of liability would be made out for those
able to substantiate exposure and injury, provided the defendant
either did no research or did not reveal negative research.'4 The
end result would be compensation for plaintiffs exposed to a product
and who suffered a health impairment that the defendant could not
prove was not attributable to its products.1
4 1
Eliminating causation in toxic tort cases is not anti-scientific.
Rather, it compels corporations to engage in more scientific
research, "not to win lawsuits, but to protect society against the risks
135. Berger, supra note 110, at 2134.
136. Id. at 2134, 2139.
137. Id. at 2140.
138. Id. at 2141.
139. Id. at 2143.
140. Berger, supra note 110, at 2144.
141. Id. at 2146.
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posed by their products."'142 In this scenario, in litigation against the
food industry for recoupment of Medicaid costs, scientific evidence
would only need to establish the common sense fact that over-
consumption of food products is linked to obesity. 43 Liability would
depend upon the aforementioned model on proving that the food
industry failed to develop and disclose substantial information that is
needed to assess obesity risks related to consumption of their
products.'44
Another legislative method to achieve the goal of eliminating
proof of causation against the food industry is for state legislatures to
enact legislation to that effect. 145 In its litigation against the tobacco
industry, the State of Florida enacted legislation that permitted the
use of statistics to prove causation and damages. 146 Further, though
the provision was subsequently declared unconstitutional,' 47 the
Florida statute originally allowed the state to proceed in large claim
cases without identifying individual Medicaid recipients.
148
Conditioning liability on a plaintiff's ability to prove that the
product of a single food industry company caused the plaintiff's
obesity is counterproductive. The insistence on causation linked to a
particular company or product creates incentives on the part of food
companies to avoid research information that may disclose the
extent of the harmful nature of its products.
IV. THE PROPER ROLE OF THE TORT SYSTEM IN REGULATING
THE FOOD INDUSTRY
A. The Tort System as a Complement to Legislative
and Administrative Regulation
The judicial treatment of the prior New York cases brought by
individual plaintiffs seeking to hold the food industry liable for
obesity creates a burden to define a role for the tort system in
142. Id. at 2152.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Sherrill, supra note 44, at 502-03 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(9)
(West 1996)).
146. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(9) (West 1996)).
147. Id. (citing Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus., 678 So.2d
1239, 1255-56 (Fla. 1996)).
148. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(9)(a) (West 1996)).
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regulating the food industry. This Comment suggests that courts
have an important role to play in enforcing the regulation of the
food industry-complementing the efforts of legislatures and the
regulatory agencies that carry out their mandates.1 49
Legislatures and administrative agencies have important limita-
tions which courts do not have. First, an industry may exert signify-
cant lobbying resources toward legislators as well as the admini-
strative agencies that govern the industry.15° Second, regulatory
enforcement of the food industry could be severely limited because
of a lack of agency resources. 5' The threat of tort liability would
provide an incentive for the food industry to police itself. In the
modern regulatory environment, the tort system plays an essential
role in complementing the work of legislatures and administrative
agencies.
The fear of a "tobacco-style legal quagmire" has compelled
some members of the food industry to disclose more nutritional
information and offer more healthy choices on their menus.
15 2
Several companies are voluntarily setting up public health programs
and modifying their marketing strategies, such as airing public-
service announcements about health and eating in moderation and
funding new in-school physical fitness programs.
1 53
Critics of allowing litigation against the food industry suggest
that the threat of litigation may be alleviated as more food com-
panies go the "healthful route" and provide consumers with more
information about their products. 54 However, it must be remem-
bered that food companies did not begin acting voluntarily until
149. For a discussion of the complementary role of courts in efforts to regulate
tobacco products, see Peter D. Jacobson & Kenneth E. Warner, Litigation and Public
Health Policy Making: The Case of Tobacco Control, 24 J. OF HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L.,
769, 770 (1999); in regulating gun manufacturers, see Timothy D. Lytton, Tort
Claims Against Gun Manufacturers for Crime-Related Injuries: Defining a Suitable Role for
the Tort System in Regulating the Firearms Industry, 65 Mo. L. REv. 1 (2000).
150. See generally NESTLE, supra note 5, at 95-110. See also PETER BELL & JEFFREY
O'CONNELL, ACCIDENTAL JUSTICE 97 (1997) (discussing the concept of "agency
capture"); Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of
Products Liability, 60 Mo. L. REv. 1, 65 (1995).
151. See discussion supra Section II.C.
152. Meislik, supra note 11, at 799-801.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 811-12 (citing David Phelps, The Bottom Line; Legal Threats Haunt Fast-
Food Industry; Few Rushing to Court Yet, but the Specter of Lawsuits Already is Changing
the Menu, STAR TRIB. (Minn.), Oct. 12, 2003, at 3A).
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2003 in their effort to avoid negative publicity and potential litiga-
tion. 155 This comment contends government regulation of the food
industry is needed and tort liability for Medicaid recoupment should
be imposed to ensure compliance with government regulation.
Prior to the 1998 MSA, 5 6 in June 1997 an unsuccessful attempt
at a "global settlement" with the federal government was pro-
posed.' 7  Though Congress considered various versions of the
global settlement, Congressional approval was given to provisions of
the global settlement that would have included regulation of the
tobacco products by FDA and industry immunity from private
lawsuits. 15' However, when the terms of the global settlement
became unacceptable to the participating tobacco manufacturers, the
manufacturers withdrew its support and engaged in heavy lobbying
which killed the settlement proposal in 1998.15
After the federal proposal was defeated, state attorneys general
continued to meet with tobacco industry representatives to discuss a
less comprehensive settlement.16° In 1998, the attorneys general and
the participating tobacco manufacturers announced the MSA. 16 1 The
MSA was a positive step in the regulation of the tobacco industry.
The participating tobacco manufacturers agreed to pay approxi-
mately $8 billion per year to various states as reimbursement for
medical expenses paid by the states.' 62 They also agreed to certain
advertising restrictions and to pay $250 million to create a national
foundation that funds health studies and pays for anti-tobacco
advertising.
163
155. Id. at 799.
156. The original participating manufacturers to the MSA were Philip Morris, Inc.;
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.; Lorillard Tobacco Co.; and Brown Williamson Tobacco
Corp. Scott, supra note 17, at 1101 n.33. Since the agreement, other tobacco
manufacturers have subsequently followed suit. Id.
157. Id. at 1101.
158. Id. (citing S. Res. 1415, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998) (McCain Bill endorsed
by Senate Commerce Committee)).
159. Id. (citing Jonathan D. Salant, Tobacco Company's Lobbying Costs Drop,
Associated Press On-Line, Sept. 28, 1999 (reporting that the tobacco industry spent
$37 million in lobbying and $40 million in advertising in 1998 to defeat the federal
settlement proposal, and that lobbying costs dropped 70% in 1999 when the
battleground shifted to the courts)).
160. Scott, supra note 17, at 1101.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1103 (citing MSA § IX).
163. Id. (citing MSA §§ III, VI). The national foundation is known as the American
Legacy Foundation. Id. at 1103 n.48.
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More specifically, the MSA bans all advertising using characters
but not human figures.' 64 Tobacco ads on billboards, buses, and
subway cars are banned, but outdoor ads smaller than fourteen
square feet are permitted. 165 Tobacco advertising in sports arenas
and venues is banned, but tobacco companies are each allowed to
sponsor one sporting event a year for each brand they manufac-
ture. 166
Further, in the MSA, participating tobacco manufacturers state
that they are "committed to reducing underage tobacco use.
'67
However, no MSA provisions regulate self-service displays, point-of-
sale advertising, or vending machines. 6 The participating tobacco
companies agreed not to target underage tobacco users, but are not
required to print additional and unequivocal health warnings on
their packages. 169
Most pertinent to this comment is the fact that the MSA
contained no "look-back" provisions which set industry targets and
penalties for the failure to conform and achieve the goals of the
MSA.170 The MSA was not a result of legislative enactment and thus
is not subject to federal agency control. As a result, the MSA has
been described as "largely toothless" in regulating the tobacco
industry. 7' This comment contends that Congress should focus its
efforts on promulgating appropriate legislative measures to regulate
the food industry and curb the obesity epidemic. Enforcement of
such regulations should be left to the tort system. Specifically, states
should be allowed to bring Medicaid recoupment claims against the
food industry if the industry attempts to circumvent such
regulations.
164. Scott, supra note 17, at 1103 (citing MSA §§ 111(b), III(c)(2)).
165. Id. at 1101 (citing MSA §§ 111(d), 11()).
166. Id. (citing MSA §§ 111(d), III(c)(2)).
167. Id. (citing MSA § I).
168. Id.
169. Scott, supra note 17, at 1101 (citing MSA § 111(a)).
170. Id. at 1103.
171. Id. at 1104.
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B. Enforcing Regulations Imposed on the Food Industry: State
Medicaid Recoupment Claims For the Costs of Obesity
1. Borrowing Strategies From Litigation Against the Tobacco
Industry
The two fatal flaws of the original litigation against the tobacco
industry were (1) the plaintiffs' inability to match the tobacco
companies' "war chests" and (2) juries' lack of sympathy for plaintiffs
who willingly exposed themselves to harm.172 However, the eventual
litigation against the tobacco industry embodied innovative solutions
to those problems. 173 The most successful of these solutions were
lawsuits filed by state attorneys general, allied with private attorneys,
seeking recovery of damages for the costs incurred by their state
Medicaid programs in treating tobacco-related illnesses. The
benefits of this new strategy quickly became apparent to other
attorneys general, and soon the tobacco industry faced Medicaid
suits from nearly every state in the country. 75 The legal strategies
employed during the final stages of litigation against the tobacco
industry produced several unique methods of recovery that can be
applicable in the potential litigation against the food industry today.
On May 23, 1994, the Attorney General of Mississippi, Michael
Moore, in conjunction with private attorney Richard Scruggs,
launched an attack on the tobacco industry by filing the first
Medicaid recoupment lawsuit against the tobacco industry.76 By
172. Bryce A. Jensen, From Tobacco to Health Care and Beyond-A Critique of Lawsuits
Targeting Unpopular Industries, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1334, 1343 (2001) (citing Tucker
S. Player, Note, After the Fall: The Cigarette Papers, the Global Settlement, and the Future
of Tobacco Litigation, 49 S.C. L. REv. 311, 313, 316 (1998)).
173. Id. (citing Ingrid L. Dietsch Field, Comment, No Ifs, Ands or Butts: Big Tobacco
Is Fighting for Its Life Against a New Breed of Plaintiffs Armed With Mounting Evidence, 27
U. BALT. L. REV. 99, 114-16 (1997); Susan E. Kearns, Note, Decertification of Statewide
Tobacco Class Actions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1336, 1340 (1999)).
174. Id. at 1344 (citing Kearns, supra note 173, at 1340). See generally Sherrill,
supra note 44; Margaret A. Little, A Most Dangerous Indiscretion: The Legal, Economic,
and Political Legacy of the Governments' Tobacco Litigation, 33 CONN. L. REv. 1143, 1147
(2001).
175. Jensen, supra note 172, at 1344 (citing Richard L. Cupp, Jr., A Morality Play's
Third Act: Revisiting Addiction, Fraud and Consumer Choice in "Third Wave" Tobacco
Litigation, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 465, 476-77 (1998)).
176. Id. (citing David A. Hyman, Tobacco Litigation's Third-Wave: Has Justice Gone
Up in Smoke?, 2 J. HEALTH CARE L, & POL'Y 34, 36-37 (1998); Adam Bryant, Who's
Afraid ofDickie Scruggs?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 6, 1999, at 46, 49).
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using the "blameless" state agency, Medicaid, as the plaintiff, the
tobacco companies were denied their previously successful assump-
tion of the risk defense. 17  The complaint asserted theories that
served as a template for subsequent actions filed by other states.
17
Most of the complaints filed against the tobacco industry alleged
the traditional causes of action: conspiracy, fraud or fraudulent
misrepresentation, breach of warranty, negligent undertaking of a
voluntary duty, design defect, nuisance, violations of state consumer
protection laws, violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) Act,179 and, most significantly, unjust
enrichment.8 The theory of unjust enrichment is defined as "[a]
benefit obtained from another, not intended as a gift and not legally
justifiable, for which the beneficiary must make restitution or
recompense."' 181 The remedy for unjust enrichment is restitution. 2
Subsequent to the filing of the Mississippi litigation, the Florida
legislature passed the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act (MTPLA),
thus allowing similar suits to be brought in Florida. 83  This
unprecedented legislation denied the tobacco industry defendants
their previously successful common law affirmative defenses. The
legislation allowed the application of market share liability, replaced
the concepts of causation and damages with "statistical analysis," and
removed the requirements that the state identify individual
recipients whose illnesses were treated through the state's Medicaid
program.
184
Another approach, exemplified by the state of Minnesota,
involved state litigation accompanied by a suit by the state's Blue
Cross/Blue Shield health insurer, working closely with the Attorney
177. Id. (citing Hyman, supra note 176, at 37 and n.19).
178. Little, supra note 174, at 1147. Little was counsel for Philip Morris
Companies, Inc. and briefed and argued a constitutional and statutory challenge to
the State of Connecticut's contingency fee contract with counsel suing the tobacco
companies in Connecticut's recoupment action against the tobacco companies. Id.
at n.al.
179. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1970).
180. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 506-07. Copies of the states' complaints are
available at http:/www.stic.neu.edu/Libraries.html.
181. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1573 (8th ed. 2004).
182. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 507.
183. Little, supra note 174, at 1147 (citing Florida Medicaid Third-Party Act, FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 409.9 10 (West 1995)).
184. Id.; see also Sherrill, supra note 44, at 502-04.
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General's office.8 5 This approach created an entirely new category
of lawsuits that eventually resulted in many state-regulated Blue
Cross/Blue Shield organizations filing actions against the tobacco
industry as well.
18 6
By 1999, the tobacco industry was facing concerted recoupment
litigation at every level of political organization (federal, state,
county, and municipal) in the United States.8 7 The tobacco industry
was also litigating with non-governmental entities which filed similar
claims.18 8  Further, foreign governments also entered the fray by
filing recoupment suits in American courts as well as courts in their
own countries.'8 9
Inevitably, the sheer weight of the Rending litigation resulted in
a settlement with the tobacco industry.F9o The participating tobacco
companies first settled with four states that were approaching trial
under agreements valued at approximately $40 billion. 191 This was
followed by the MSA in which forty-six states entered into a $206
billion settlement to be paid over the following twenty-five years.
192
The tobacco companies also committed to contributing $1.5 billion
to an anti-smoking education and advertising campaign and $250
185. Little, supra note 174, at 1148.
186. Id. This approach was not entirely effective. See infra Section IV.B.3.c.
187. Little, supra note 174, at 1148-49.
188. Id. Phillip Morris was defending 530 lawsuits by the end of 1997: 375
individual personal injury cases, fifty class action cases including second-hand
smoke cases, and 105 health care recoupment cases, mostly brought by governments
and unions. Id. at 1148 n.28 (citing Jerry Bulow & Paul Klemperer, The Tobacco
Deal, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS, Nov. 1998, at
323, 332). R.J. Reynolds was defending 540 cases by March 3, 1998, as compared
with fifty-four cases at the end of 1994. Id.
189. Little, supra note 174, at 1148-49 (citing Hanoch Dagan & James J. White,
Governments, Citizens and Injurious Industries, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 363 (2000)).
190. Jensen, supra note 172, at 1344; Little, supra note 174, at 1143.
191. Little, supra note 174, at 1171. Minnesota, Mississippi, Texas, and Florida
were the original four states reaching settlements with the tobacco industry. Jensen,
supra note 172, at 1345 n.82. These four states that settled earlier received more
money than they would have under the national settlement, as well as non-monetary
concessions that the remaining forty-six states did not receive. Id. (citing Michael V.
Ciresi, An Account of the Legal Strategies That Ended an Era of Tobacco Industry
Immunity, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 439, 441-42 (1999); Richard A. Daynard &
Graham E. Kelder Jr., The Many Virtues of Tobacco Litigation, TRIAL, Nov. 1998, at
42).
192. Little, supra note 174, at 1171 (citing the MSA, available at
http://www.naag.org/tobac/cigmsa.rtf).
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million for a foundation dedicated to reducing underage smoking.'93
These settlements are reported to represent the largest privately-
negotiated redistribution of wealth in world history.'9 4
2. Application of Tobacco Litigation Strategies to Medicaid
Recoupment Suits Against the Food Industry
a. Lessons Learned
As previously discussed, engaging private counsel on a
contingency fee basis would result in a no-lose situation for state
attorneys general against the food industry.'9 Other than arriving
at an agreement between the state and private attorney, there are no
apparent restrictions on the ability of attorneys general to appoint
outside counsel. 196 If the states prevail, the states are likely to collect
billions of dollars that could then be used to help fight obesity. On
the other hand, if the claims fail, the states would not be required to
pay legal fees because the private attorneys would have been
retained on a contingency basis.
The inclusion of state governments in a lawsuit brings credibility
and a "moral authority" to the cause. 197 As a result, an industry that
initially appears blameless begins to be perceived as culpable in the
public's opinion as public authorities align themselves against it,' 98
b. The Doctrine of Parens Patriae
As noted above, the Medicaid statute requires a state that
participates in Medicaid to develop a procedure for recovering funds
from third parties liable for the injuries of Medicaid recipients.' 9
However, the recovery provision created by the state does not create
a new federal right of recovery for the state, but rather is dependent
193. Id.
194. Id. (citing Michael E. DeBow, The State Tobacco Litigation and Separation of
Powers in State Governments: Repairing the Damage, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 1, 2-3
(2001)).
195. See, e.g.,Jensen, supra note 172, at 1344.
196. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 516.
197. Jensen, supra note 172, at 1370.
198. Id.
199. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 501 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25) (1996)).
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upon the substantive law of the state in which recovery is sought.2°°
The Medicaid statute does not require participating states to
recognize any particular theories of liability for the recovery of
Medicaid funds. °1 Only where it is available under state law is it
required that a state pursue recovery against a liable third party.20 2
The legal theories against the tobacco industry varied from state
to state.20 3  While some state legislatures may be willing to enact
measures similar to the Florida statutes against the tobacco industry
(giving the state attorney general statutory authority to bring suit
against the food industry) undoubtedly other state legislatures will
not. For those attorneys general who cannot derive authority for a
cause of action against the food industry from their state statutory
schemes, another source of authority can be derived directly from
individual state sovereignty.2°4
The State of Louisiana's claim for damages against the tobacco
industry is particularly instructive. 205 Though no legal theory against
the tobacco industry was ever tested in court, the principles of the
parens patriae doctrine employed by Louisiana's trial team serve as
an example for potential actions by attorneys general against the
food industry.2 °6
A state's actionable interests may be sovereign, quasi-sovereign,
or proprietary. 20 7 Food industry conduct that violates criminal law,
civil law, or other regulatory provisions compromises the sovereignty
of a state and can be the subject of a civil action brought in the
state's name. 20 ' As a sovereign, the state has authority to do more
than merely enforce its laws; a state exists to promote the health,




203. See discussion supra Section IV.B.1.
204. See generally Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1859. Ieyoub was the
Louisiana Attorney General who led the trial team that sued the tobacco industry on
behalf of the state. Id. at 1859 n.al. Eisenberg served as a consultant to the
Louisiana private counsel who represented the State of Louisiana in its action
against the tobacco industry. Id.
205. See generally id.
206. Id. at 1862.
207. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1863.
208. Id. (citing Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600-01
(1982)).
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safety, and welfare of its citizens. 2°9  A state's quasi-sovereign
interests include its citizen's health, safety, welfare, as well as, a
healthful environment for those citizens.2' ° In contrast, a state's
proprietary interests are those that the state asserts on its own behalf
as any other legal entity.2 1
Lawsuits brought on behalf of states' sovereign and quasi-
sovereign interests are sometimes referred to as parens patriae
actions. 12 However, the Latin label is not always used.213  Parens
patriae literally means "parent of the country. 214 Regardless of the
label used, under parens patriae a state may recover costs or
damages incurred because of acts that threaten the health, safety,
and welfare of the state's citizens. 5 Parens patriae actions are
infrequently litigated because it is rare that a breach of duty is on
such a scale to warrant civil state involvement.
216
Courts uniformly recognize a state's authority to protect its
interests under the doctrine of parens patriae.217 The principles of
the parens partriae doctrine have been approved by the United
States Supreme Court and endorsed by the states.21 8 The doctrine
generally follows the same principles in both federal and state
courts.2 ' State court cases brought under the theory of the doctrine
of parens patriae regularly rely on federal precedents.220
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. (citing Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601-02).
212. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1863 (citing Snapp, 458 U.S. at 600-01).
213. Id. The doctrinal labels used to support states' actions on behalf of their
citizenry vary, and sometimes no doctrinal labels are used. Id. (citing Wyandotte
Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 193 (1967) (allowing the United States
to sue to "protect its interests" in a cause of action for costs of cleanup)). Sometimes
the state's action is framed as one brought by the trustee of property for the benefit
of the public. Id. (citing State v. City of Bowling Green, 313 N.E.2d 409, 411 (Ohio
1974) (allowing a cause of action for damages to the environment)). Sometimes
cases to protect the public are labeled actions brought under the state's power as
parens patriae. Id. (citing Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607-08 (allowing Puerto Rico to
proceed as parens patriae in a suit to protect the economic interests of a class of
workers)).
214. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1863 (citing Snapp, 458 U.S. at 600).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1864.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1871.
219. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1864.
220. Id. (citing e.g., State ex rel. Ieyoub v. Bordens, Inc., 684 So. 2d 1024, 1026 (La.
Ct. App. 1996) (citing Snapp, 458 U.S. at 592)).
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The United States Supreme Court reviewed the history of the
parens patriae doctrine in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico.221
In that case, the Court recognized a state's "quasi-sovereign"
interests.222 However, what is a quasi-sovereign interest is less clear
than what is a sovereign interest.223  Quasi-sovereign interests
represent the state's concern for the well-being of its citizens. 224 "A
quasi-sovereign interest must be sufficiently concrete to create an
actual controversy between the [s]tate and the defendant. The
vagueness of this concept can only be filled in by turning to
individual cases." 225 After considering several parens patriae cases,
the United States Supreme Court summarized the doctrine as
follows:
In order to maintain [a parens patriae] action, the [s]tate must
articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private
parties, i.e., the [s]tate must be more than a nominal party. The
[s]tate must express a quasi-sovereign interest. Although the
articulation of such interests is a matter for case-by-case develop-
ment-neither an exhaustive formal definition nor a definitive
list of qualifying interests can be presented in the abstract-
certain characteristics of such interests are so far evident. These
characteristics fall into two general categories. First, a [s]tate has
a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being-both
physical and economic-of its residents in general. Second, a
[sitate has a quasi-sovereign interest in not being discriminatorily
denied its rightful status within the federal system.226
Therefore, the only requirement is the inclusion of public health
interests for many possible attorney general causes of action; the
interests qualifying as quasi-sovereign interests "extend well beyond
the prevention of such traditional public nuisances.,
227
Of the many state causes of action filed against the tobacco
industry, only one case expressly considers a state's authority to
vindicate its sovereign interest under the parens patriae doctrine in
order to maintain a cause of action for harm to the health, safety,
221. Id. (citing Snapp, 458 U.S. at 600-06).
222. Id. at 1866 (citing Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601-02).
223. Id. at 1866-68.
224. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1866 (citing Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602).
225, Id. (quoting Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602).
226, Id. at 1867-68 (quoting Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607).
227. Id. at 1868 (quoting Snapp, 458 U.S. at 605).
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and welfare of its people.228 In Texas v. American Tobacco Co.,229 the
district court sustained the state's authority to bring such a cause of
action.23° The district court directly considered whether the State of
Texas could maintain a common-law parens patriae action without
statutory authority. 231 Relying on Snapp, the judge concluded that
the State of Texas could maintain such an action. 232 The district
court expressly noted that the United States Supreme Court had
sustained actions by states to protect quasi-sovereign interests and
that these "interests can relate to either the physical or economic
well-being of the citizenry., 233 The district court then found that the
State of Texas had a sufficient quasi-sovereign interest to maintain
its cause of action, stating:
First, it is without question that the [s]tate is not a nominal party
to this suit. The [s]tate expends millions of dollars each year in
order to provide medical care to its citizens under Medicaid.
Furthermore, participating in the Medicaid program and having
it operate in an efficient and cost-effective manner improves the
health and welfare of the people of Texas. If the allegations of
the complaint are found to be true, the economy of the [s]tate
and the welfare of its people have suffered at the hands of the
Defendants. It is clear to the Court that the [s]tate can maintain
this action pursuant to its quasi-sovereign interests found at
common law.
234
In cases against the food industry for recovery of Medicaid
expenditures related to obesity, the American Tobacco Co. ruling has
implications for actions brought by state attorneys general. As
American Tobacco Co. demonstrates, a food company's alleged
wrongdoing can give rise to a viable cause of action absent any
statutory authorization.235  The states' quasi-sovereign interests,
228. Id. at 1870 (citing Texas v. American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956 (E.D.
Tex. 1997)).
229. 14 F. Supp. 2d 956 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
230. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1870 (citing American Tobacco Co., 14 F.
Supp. 2d at 962).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. (citing American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d at 962).
234. Id. at 1870-71 (citing Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d at 962-63 (citation
omitted) (footnote omitted)).
235. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1871.
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standing-alone, give the states authority to prosecute an action
against the food industry.
236
In the tobacco litigation, the states' authority to sue under the
doctrine of parens patriae was important for several reasons.237 The
doctrine of parens patriae (1) established the authority of attorneys
general and the states to sue; (2) limited the scope of potential
industry defenses and statutory preemptory claims; and (3) provided
an additional basis for monetary and injunctive relief.238 Whether
these benefits will assist attorneys general in cases against the food
industry will depend on the harms they seek to remedy, the other
legal theories available to them, and the defenses that may be
available to potential food industry defendants.239
Because most of the leading cases were decided during the early
1900s, the modern limits of the parens patriae doctrine are
unknown.240 In assessing the scope of a modern use of the parens
patriae doctrine by attorneys general, three kinds of limitations have




In determining whether to exercise the states' parens patriae
power against the food industry, state attorneys general should242
consider at least two prudential factors. First, actions brought
under the parens patriae doctrine should be limited to circumstances
that demonstrate substantial and serious harm to a state's citizens.243
Wrongdoing against individuals or small groups usually will not
require use of the doctrine. 244 The tobacco litigation exemplifies the
massive harm that warrants action under the parens patriae
doctrine.245
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1875.
238. Id. at 1875-79.
239. Id. at 1875.
240. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1879.
241. Id. at 1880.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1880.
244. Id.
245. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1880.
[VOL. 1:433
2005] DEFINING THE PROPER ROLE FOR THE TORT SYSTEM 469
Second, other available remedies and causes of action available
to attorneys general must be inadequate in some respect.24 The
tobacco litigation again serves as an example.247 The lawsuits against
the tobacco companies were not battles that individual citizens could
or should be expected to fight against the tobacco industry's massive
marketing, scientific, public relations, and legal resources. 24 The
harms caused to states were independent of those harms caused to
individual smokers and were interests that only the states could
vindicate. 249
2. Practical Limits
Perhaps the single most important practical limit in using the
doctrine of parens patriae against the food industry will be the
willingness of state attorneys general to act in concert.25° Perhaps
the most important lesson to be learned from the tobacco litigation
is that states can be most effective when they act in unison.2 1  State
attorneys general did not always present a united front against the
tobacco industry. 2 2  Actions by state attorneys general were not
taken seriously when only a few states brought suits against the





250. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1881.
251. Id.
252. Id. (citing David S. Samford, Note, Cutting Deals in Smoke-Filled Rooms: A Case
Study in Public Choice Theory, 87 KY. L.J. 845, 868, 869 (1998-1999)).
253. Id. The tobacco industry's aggressive tactics against state attorneys general
discouraged Colorado from filing suit. Id. at 1881 n. 116 (citing Joan Beck, Deadly
Defense, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 26, 1996, at 1 lA). Wisconsin's attorney
general stated that he would wait to see how the other states did before filing suit.
Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1881 n.l 16 (citing Paul Norton, Doyle: Wait,
See on Tobacco Suit, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison), Feb. 26, 1996, at 1A). New
Hampshire's attorney general said that New Hampshire could just sit it out and sign
on when and if the states win. Id. (citing Norma Love, Democrats: New Hampshire
Should Sue Tobacco Companies, AP POL. SERVICE, Apr. 2, 1996, available at 1996 WL
5375466). Ohio's attorney general stated that "[miany of the legal theories being
used in the lawsuits are untested and unproven." Id. (quoting Bob Van Voris, AG's
Claims Mere Smoke?, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 28, 1997, at Al). The Alabama attorney
general's task force concluded that the legal arguments being made by other state
attorneys general were "at best weak and at worst bizarre." Id.
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
turning point at which unified state action began to pressure the
tobacco industry into settlement negotiations. Before this first
settlement, only six states had sued the tobacco industry.255 By 1997,
a set of separate state actions had evolved into a nation wide action
against the tobacco industry and national settlements followed.256
3. Legal Limits
Legal limits of the parens patriae doctrine are a question of
state law.257 State legislatures can define the scope of their respective
state's parens patriae doctrine to be as broad or as narrow as the
state legislature sees fit, subject to federal and state constitutional
limitations. 258 Further, several types of state laws can be viewed as
statutory embodiments of parens patriae principles, such as an
unfair and deceptive trade practices statute. " Similarly, some states
may have the power through their state constitution to limit
assertions of the power of the parens patriae doctrine or judicial
recognition of that power.260 Assuming that states bringing suit
against the food industry to recover Medicaid costs choose to adhere
to currently existing case law governing the parens patriae doctrine,
the following sets forth a summary of the established legal limita-
tions.
First, as stated above, a state's action against the food industry
under the parens patriae doctrine requires that the state not be
acting in a proprietary capacity. 261 Only when the state itself is
harmed by tortious or contractual misconduct can it directly
vindicate its interests as fully as any other litigant.262 Second, states
cannot be acting simply as enforcement agencies for small collec-
tions of private individuals against the food industry.263  A state
interest beyond that of private parties must exist to give rise to a
254. Id. at 1881 (citing Lynn Mather, Theorizing About Trial Courts: Lawyers,
Policymaking, and Tobacco Litigation, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 897, 923 (1998)).




259. Id. at 1882 (citing, e.g., Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1401-1418 (Supp. 2000)).
260. Id.
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sustainable action against the food industry under the parens patriae
doctrine .26'
c. Recoupment of Medicaid Costs Incurred Treating Obesity
Related Health Problems is a Quasi-Sovereign State Interest
As indicated above, the United States Supreme Court has not set
out the exact nature of a quasi-sovereign state interest.265 However,
the states' interest in the health, safety, and welfare (physical and
economic) of their citizens has supported such actions in the past,
specifically against the tobacco industry.266 Although such actions
are available to attorneys general against the food industry today,
causes of action under the parens patriae doctrine are not means b
which states can avoid other important prerequisites to legal relief.
2 7
In particular, the requirement remains that members of the food
industry breach some legal duty that harms a state's parens patriae
interest.
268
While the parens patriae doctrine helps articulate a state's legal
interest against the food industry, it does not define the defendant's
legal duties.269 State litigation that relies on the parens patriae
doctrine must be within the limits of the doctrine and demonstrate a
breach of legal duties by the potential defendants.270
As mentioned above, Congress has mandated that states partici-
pating in the Medicaid program must include in their administra-
tion plan a procedure for recovering funds from third parties that
264. Id.
265. See supra notes 222-27 and accompanying text.
266. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1866, 1883.
267. Id. at 1883.
268. Id.
'U]udicial relief sometimes may be granted to a quasi-sovereign state under
circumstances which would not justify relief if the suit were between private
parties....' But, in general, the cases involve misbehavior by defendants
that likely would give rise to liability under some nuisance or other tort
theory .... And it 'must appear that the state has suffered a wrong
furnishing ground for judicial redress or is asserting a right susceptible of
judicial enforcement.' Id. at 1864 n. 18 (citing Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S.
12, 16-17 (1927)).
269. Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 1883. The tobacco litigation complaints
generally contained several allegations of breach of legal duties. Id. at 1883 n. 124
(citing e.g., American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d at 965-74 (alleging product liability,
RICO, antitrust, consumer, nuisance, and fraud claims)).
270. Id.
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are liable for the injuries of Medicaid recipients.271 This principle of. . .. P "272
restitution is not subject to the discretion of the states. The
statutory scheme enacted by the participating state must include
recovery procedures.273
However, a state's statutory recovery provision does not create a
federal right of recovery; rather, the right of recovery is dependent
on the substantive state law in which recovery is sought.274 If state
law does not recognize a particular cause of action, the Medicaid
statute does not require the creation of such a cause of action.275 In
contrast, where liability is available under state law, the state must
pursue the action against the third party.
276
Thus, the first step for a state's attorney general will be to
consult that state's Medicaid statutory scheme to determine the
possible causes of action available to them in their recoupment
actions against the food industry. 7  Similar to the litigation against
the tobacco industry, state attorneys general should focus on the
theory of unjust enrichment 27 8-the remedy for which is restitu-
tion.27'
As the discussion above demonstrates, the food industry is
primarily focused on successfully generating large profits by selling
its products to consumers without assuming any responsibility for the
harmful consequences. Thus, state attorneys general should argue
that the states are indirectly conferring a benefit upon the food
industry by paying the health care costs related to obesity through
271. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 501 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25) (1996)). The
state plan must take all "reasonable measures to ascertain the legal liability of third
parties." Id. at 501 n.35.
[W]here such a legal liability is found to exist after medical assistance has
been made available on behalf of the recipient, and where the amount of
reimbursement the State can reasonably expect to recover exceeds the cost
of such recovery, the state will seek reimbursement for such assistance to
the extent of the legal liability .... Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(B)
(1996)).
272. Id. at 501.
273. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25) (1996); HCFA State Fiscal Administration
Rule, 42 C.F.R. § 433.138 (1996)).
274. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 502 (citing Philip Morris, 942 F. Supp. at 694).
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See id. at 507.
278. Id.
279. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 507.
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state funds, which are soon will directly include state Medicaid
funds.28 °
3. Anticipating Food Industry Defense Tactics
In an effort to increase the ability of each state to recover
Medicaid expenses from tobacco companies, some states passed
third-party Medicaid liability acts in the battle against the tobacco
industry. The legislation enacted in Massachusetts was relatively
limited and only provoked minor attacks during removal pro-
ceedings brought by the tobacco companies.282 While the state was
expressly given a separate and independent cause of action against
cigarette manufacturers, no special provisions eliminated the
tobacco industry's traditional defenses.28 3  Though the tobacco
industry may have argued against the statute on the grounds of
equal protection because of the act's singular specification of
cigarette manufacturers, this issue was not addressed by the
Massachusetts federal district court in its decision to remand the case
to state court.28 4
In contrast, Florida's statute was the most aggressive in increase-
ing the potential liability of the tobacco industry and, as a result, it
quickly encountered direct constitutional attacks.285 Florida's statute
eliminated affirmative defenses of the tobacco industry, including
assumption of risk and comparative negligence. 286  Further, the
statute eliminated the defense of statute of repose,287 applied joint
280. Id. (citing Michael C. Moore & Charles J. Mikhail, The Fight Against Tobacco: A
New Attack on Smoking Using an Old-Time Remedy, 111 DHHS Pub. Health Rep. 192,
May 1996)).
281. See generally id. at 502-05.
282. Id. at 502 (citing Philip Morris, 942 F. Supp. at 691-92).
283. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 504 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 118E, § 22
(West 1996) and 1994 Mass. Acts ch. 60, § 276).
284. Id. at 504-05 (citing Philip Morris, 942 F. Supp. at 690).
285. Id. at 502 (citing Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus., 678 So.
2d 1239 (Fla. 1996)).
286. Id. at 502-03 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(1) (West 1996)). "Principles of
common law and equity as to... comparative negligence, assumption of the risk,
and all other affirmative defenses normally available to a liable third party, are to be
abrogated to the extent necessary to ensure full recovery by Medicaid from third-
party resources .... " Id. at 502 n.45 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.9 10(1)).
287. Id. at 503 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(12)(h)).
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and several liability to any recovery, 2ss allowed the market share
theory of liability,2 9 permitted treble damages in cases of criminal
violations, 290 permitted the use of statistics to prove causation and
damages, 291 and eliminated the need to identify individual recipients
in large claims.292
a. Discovery Tactics
Successful litigation against the food industry may ultimately
depend on the limits placed on discovery.293 If precedent holds, the
food industry will attempt to force the states to identify each
Medicaid recipient for whom the state claims restitution.294 The
intent of the food industry will be to controvert the issue of
causation, thereby introducing the issue of whether the states can
prove particular food products or food companies caused the obesity
related health problems for which the Medicaid recipient was
treated.295 As discussed previously, causation is perhaps the first and
foremost important issue which must be resolved before state
attorneys general begin filing suits against the food industry for
recoupment of Medicaid costs incurred as a result of treating health
related problems caused by obesity.29
The tobacco litigation suggests that courts may be willing to
limit such discovery. 29 Another step in the right direction occurred
288. Id. at 502-03 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.9 10(1)).
289. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 503 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(9)(b)).
290. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(19)).
291. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(9)).
292. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(12)(h)).
293. Id. at 509.
294. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 509 (citing Discovery Battle Still Rages in Mississippi's
Medicaid Reimbursement Case, 10 MEALEY's LITIG. REP.: TOBACCO No. 11 (Oct. 3,
1996)).
295. Id. In Florida, the district court refused to allow the tobacco industry's
discovery request, finding that investigation and/or deposition of named Medicaid
patients was not necessary under the Florida Third Party Liability Act. Id. at 509
n.99 (citing State Can Submit Patient ID Numbers in Medicaid Reimbursement Suit, Court
Says, 4 Health Care Policy Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at D-28 (Oct. 28, 1996) [hereinafter
Health Care Pol'y Rep.]).
296. See supra Section III.C. 1.
297. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 509 (citing Henry Weinstein & Jack Nelson, Untested
Theory Becoming Tobacco Firms' Top Threat, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1996, at Al (reporting
that Minnesota and Mississippi courts issued orders allowing the tobacco industry to
take depositions from only twenty Medicaid recipients)).
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when the Florida Supreme Court struck down the provision of the
state's statute that allowed the state to proceed against the tobacco
industry without identifying individual Medicaid recipients who were298-- -
harmed. The court based its decision on the grounds that the
provision was a violation of constitutional due process because it
created a statutory presumption that Medicaid payments were
properly made without providing defendants an opportunity to
rebut the presumption.299 However, a subsequent court ruling held
that the identification numbers of Medicaid patients satisfied the
state's discovery burden.300 Though the subsequent ruling did not
eliminate the state's burden of proving causation, it did limit the
tobacco industry's ability to depose and discover medical informa-
tion.30 1
b. Procedural Tactics
Indications from the tobacco industry litigation suggest further
that the food industry might not be successful in its attempt to
remove the cases from state to federal courts.30 2 In Massachusetts v.
Philip Morris Inc., the tobacco companies made two unsuccessful
arguments in their removal efforts which will undoubtedly be
attempted again in litigation against the food industry.30 3
First, the tobacco companies argued that the federal require-
ment of a recovery provision in a state's Medicaid statutory scheme
against liable parties brought the cases under federal question
jurisdiction.3° Second, the tobacco companies argued that because
the federal government would receive a share of any successful state
Medicaid recoupment, the federal government was an "unnamed
plaintiff with a real interest in the suit. '30 5  However, the court
rejected both arguments, finding that the states were acting under
298. Id. at 503 (citing Associated Indus., 678 So. 2d at 1255-56).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 504.
301. Id. (citing Health Care Pol'y Rep., supra note 295).
302. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 510. Federal courts in Connecticut, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, and Mississippi remanded suits back to state courts. Id. at
510 n.103.
303. Id. (citing Philip Morris, 942 F. Supp. at 692).
304. Id. (citing Philip Morris, 942 F. Supp. at 692).
305. Id.
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state law and were not roceeding as agents of, or on behalf of, the
federal goverment.
3°6
In addition, tobacco companies filed preemptive suits seeking
an injunction against the filing of a restitution suit by the state.3 °7 In
the District Court of Connecticut, Philip Morris claimed the
Medicaid suits were (1) unduly burdensome on interstate commerce,
(2) violative of due process and equal protection guarantees, and (3)
inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution due to preemption.3 8
However, federal courts uniformly rejected this tactic and
refused to enjoin the Medicaid suits.3a 9  The District Court of
Connecticut applied the Younger Abstention Doctrine 310 when it
dismissed a preemptive suit filed against Connecticut's attorney
general, finding that an important state interest was at issue.
c. Plaintiff Party Limitations
In the tobacco litigation, the defendant parties were generally
the same in each case. 312 However, in attempting various approaches
306. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 510 (citing Philip Morris, 942 F. Supp. at 696). See
also Connecticut Medicaid Case Remanded Back to State Court, 10 MEALEY'S LIIC. REP.:
TOBACCO No. 13 (Nov. 1, 1996)),
307. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 510 (citing e.g., Philip Morris, Inc. v. Blumenthal,
No. 396CV01121 (D. Conn. filed June 28, 1996); Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger,
No. 95-12574-GAO (D. Mass. filed Nov. 28, 1995); Philip Morris, Inc. v. Morales,
No. 95-14807 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Travis County filed Nov. 28, 1995)). Maryland, New
Jersey, Utah, and Hawaii were also targeted for preemptive strikes. Id. at 510 n. 107
(citing Andrew Blum, Tobacco Industy Tries Pre-emptive Lawsuits, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 23,
1996, at A6).
308. Id. (citing Complaint, at para. 23, Philip Morris, Inc. v. Blumenthal, No.
396CV0112 1).
309. Id. (citing Andrew Blum, Tobacco Industry Tries Pre-emptive Lawsuits, NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 23, 1996, at A6).
310. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S, 37 (1971).
311. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 510-11 (citing Steven Fromm, Tobacco Takes a Hit,
CONN. L. TRIB., Jan. 6, 1997, at 1 (noting the judge determined that Connecticut's
Fair Trade Act was at issue and the defendants had a fair opportunity for review of
constitutional matters in the state court; the judge determined that Younger
Abstention Doctrine was applicable due to the preemptive nature of the filing)).
312. Id. at 511. Defendant manufacturers included The American Tobacco Co.,
Liggett Group, Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., and United States Tobacco Co. Id.
at 511 n. 112. Other cases included as defendants the tobacco trade associations:
The Council for Tobacco Research-U.S.A., Inc. and The Tobacco Institute, Inc. Id.
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to litigating against the tobacco industry, different plaintiff party
configurations were tested.313
One partially unsuccessful configuration was when the State of
Minnesota joined with the Blue Cross / Blue Shield of Minnesota as
named plaintiffs.314  In Minnesota v. Philip Morris, Inc.,"' the
Minnesota Supreme Court found Blue Cross / Blue Shield lacked
standing to pursue a claim of negligent undertaking of a voluntary
duty against the tobacco industry; however, that the organization
had standing to pursue claims arising under Minnesota's state
consumer protection and antitrust statutes.31 6 The court concluded
that the Minnesota legislature had the authority to expand the
potential proper parties for statutory causes of action, but that tort
claims required more direct damages.
3 17
State attorneys general should also be aware of a second issue
that arose amidst plaintiff parties against the tobacco industry was
whether it is the responsibility of the attorney general's office or the
governor's office to bring such actions against the food industry
within their respective states. 318 For example, the Governor of
Mississippi filed suit to prevent that state's attorney general from
pursuing the Medicaid recoupment suit against the tobacco
industry.319 It was asserted that the Mississippi Attorney General
lacked authority to act in opposition to the Governor's expressed
policy as the state's chief executive officer.3 20
d. Rebutting the Slippery Slope Objections
Litigation against the food industry is not frivolous if the
evidence presented establishes the causal connection between obesity
and food consumption.321 If a cause of action has any legal merit, it
The tobacco industry public relations firm Hill & Knowlton, Inc. was also named as
a defendant in other cases. Id.
313. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 511.
314. Id.
315. 551 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. 1996).
316. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 511 (citing Philip Morris, 551 N.W.2d at 495).
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. (citing Complaint, Fordice v. Moore, No. 96-M-114 (Miss. filed Feb. 17,
1996)).
320. Id.
321. See Rogers, supra note 5, at 880 (citing John Wade, On Frivolous Litigation: A
Study of Tort Liability and Procedural Sanctions, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 433, 464 (1986)).
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is not frivolous.322 Nonetheless, the court in Pelman v. McDonald's
Corp. has noted the judiciary's concern over the slippery slope effect
of allowing such cases against the food industry to proceed.323
A "slippery slope" argument invokes the fear that once a right is
infringed upon, it will keep being infringed upon until there is
nothing left of it.32 4 A classic example of this type of argument is the
National Rifle Association's position that any prohibition of weapon
ownership will lead to the banning of all guns, including hunting
rifles.325 An example of a slippery slope argument in the First
Amendment arena is that permitting the government to ban any
type of speech (e.g., false advertising) will lead to the erosion of the
protection of other types of speech, including the prohibition of core
political speech, such as opposition to government policies.326
322. Id.
323. Id. (citing Pelman, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 518 ("Even if limited to that ilk of fare
dubbed 'fast food,' the potential for lawsuits is great .... ).
324. Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARv. L. REV. 361, 361-62 (1985)
(stating "the phenomenon referred to [by the term "slippery slope"] is that a
particular act, seeming innocuous when taken in isolation, may yet lead to a future
host of similar but increasingly pernicious events.").
325. See James Weinstein, A Constitutional Roadmap to the Regulation of Campus Hate
Speech, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 163, 183 (1991) (citing Jervis Anderson, A Reporter at
Large: An Extraordinary People, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 12, 1984, at 159-60).
326. See id. See also Joseph E. Olson & David B. Kopel, All the Way Down the Slippery
Slope: Gun Prohibition in England and Some Lessons for Civil Liberties in America, 22
HAMLINE L. REV. 399 n.3 (1999) (listing other examples as: Henry Geller & Jane H.
Yurow, The Reasonable Access Provision (312(a)(7)) of the Communications Act: Once
More Down the Slippery Slope, 34 FED. COMM. L.J. 389 (1982) (arguing that the
Federal Election Commission review of a television station's refusal to allow a
federal candidate "reasonable access" creates a slippery slope for government
control of the media's editorial decisions); John Q. La Fond, Washington's Sexually
Violent Predator Law: A Deliberate Misuse of the Therapeutic State for Social Control, 15 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 655 (1992) (arguing that allowing the civil commitment of
persons labeled as violent sexual predators creates a slippery slope to the
widespread use of lifetime confinement of other people based on only a single
crime); Jennifer L. Bradshaw, Comment, The Slippery Slope of Modern Takings
Jurisprudence in New Jersey, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 433 (1997) (discussing a
decision upholding the Pinelands Protection Act and arguing that the slippery slope
endangers Fifth Amendment property rights); and as an example of a slippery slope
argument against something other than a potential infringement of a civil liberty see
generally JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT: DOES THE ABUSE EXCUSE THREATEN
OUR LEGAL SYSTEM (1997) (asserting that expert testimony about battered women's
syndrome creates a slippery slope away from personal responsibility)).
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For their persuasive force, slippery slope arguments depend
primarily on the perceived inability of future decisionmakers to
recognize or uphold doctrinal lines.327 However, arguments based
upon the difficulty of drawing lines "are based on a fallacious view of
the nature of language, one that presupposes that a distinction that
cannot be drawn sharply should not be drawn at all."
3 28
"The slippery slope argument is almost always universally
derided by philosophers as a bad argument."3 29 Such arguments are
called "the trump card of the traditionalist" because no proposed
societal reform is immune from the slippery slope objection, no
matter how strong the arguments are in its favor.330 In fact, the
stronger the arguments in favor of the reform, as is the case against
the food industry, the more likely the traditionalist will make the
slippery slope objection because "it is then the only one he has."
33'
"The slippery slope argument is almost always an embarrass-
ment to readers who possess even a modicum of critical skill." 332
While the slippery slope argument may be a valid concern, slippery
slope claims deserve to be viewed skeptically, and the proponent of
such a claim must be expected to provide the necessary empirical
support.333
The solution is for judges who adjudicate cases against the food
industry to make their holdings and rationales explicit, giving
examples of situations in which the principles would not apply,
3A
Further, judges should disregard the speculative risks.315 Judges
should recognize their duty to decide the cases the best they can and
refuse to entertain the speculative, concern that some people in the
future may oversimplify the reasoning into something broader.336
Speculative consequences notwithstanding, Medicaid recoupment
cases against the food industry must stand on their own merits.
327. Schauer, supra note 324, at 379-81.
328. Id. at 381.
329. Eric Lode, Comment, Slippety Slope Arguments and Legal Reasoning, 87 CAL. L.
REv. 1469, 1474 n.31 (1999) (quoting Jeffrey P. Whitman, The Many Guises of the
Slippery Slope Argument, 20 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 85, 85 (1994)).
330. Id. at 1473 (citing Glanville Williams, "Mercy Killing" Legislation-A Rejoinder,
43 MINN. L. REv. 1, 9 (1958)).
331. Id.
332. Paul F. Campos, Advocacy and Scholarship, 81 CAL. L. REv. 817, 834 (1993).
333. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Obesity is a public policy issue affecting the long-term health of
America's population, and the food industry has a duty to engage in
the battle against it. As stated by the United States Surgeon General:
[The food industry] has a vital role in the prevention of over-
weight and obesity. Through the production and distribution of
food and other consumer products, [the food industry] exerts a
tremendous impact on the nutritional quality of the food we eat
and the extent of physical activity in which we engage. [The food
industry] can use that leverage to create and sustain an environ-
ment that encourages individuals to achieve and maintain a
healthy or healthier body weight.337
This comment does not endorse all tort claims against the food
industry. It argues only in favor of claims that would allow states to
recover for costs imposed upon their Medicaid agencies as a result of
obesity if the food industry fails to comply with federal regulation of
the industry.
Tort claims against the food industry can compliment legislative
efforts to regulate the industry and can thereby make a contribution
to decreasing obesity in America. Imposing restrictions on the food
industry by using tort litigation as a substitute for legislation is
improper. However, tort liability can work in conjunction with
legislative regulation, providing incentives to prevent consumers
from over-consumption and becoming obese instead of looking for
ways to simply increase sales and profits.
The same reasoning behind the Medicaid suits against the
tobacco industry products applies equally to food products, parti-
cularly food products with negative or minimal nutritional value.338
Individuals require treatment for health problems caused by poor
diet just as individuals require treatment for health problems related
to usage of tobacco products.33 9 The statistical information required
to establish a "definitive link to a specific debilitation" 340 is sufficient
to justify forcing the food industry to help pay for the negative
337. Surgeon General's Call to Action, supra note 19, at 28.
338. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 515.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 515-16.
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effects imposed on society by its products on public policy
grounds.341
State Medicaid recoupment claims are not unwarranted or
unnecessary governmental intrusions into areas of purely personal
conduct. The intent of such lawsuits is not to impose governmental
mandates on proper diet and healthy lifestyles. Further, the goal of
such state actions is not to place the power of the legislative branch
to regulate industries into the hands of state attorneys general. The
judicial branch of our government is not the arm charged with
promulgating commercial regulations, 2
The proposed state Medicaid recoupment lawsuits would allow
the tort system to serve as a complementary check on industry
compliance with legislatively authorized regulations. Further,
because the food industry is profiting from consumer purchases of
its products, the industry has a duty to compensate the state
Medicaid budgets that bear the burden of paying for the ill effects of
obesity caused by the food industry's intent to generate profits.
341. See supra Section II.
342. Sherrill, supra note 44, at 517 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
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VI. APPENDIX A
National Conference of State Legislatures
2003 - 2005 State Legislation On Civil Immunity for Food
Vendors
Below is the most recent report from the National Conference
of State Legislatures regarding action on bills introduced during the
2003-2004 and 2004-2005 legislative sessions as of February 16,
2005. This report is available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/
health/Fvmemo.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
As concern continues to mount about the growing obesity
epidemic among both children and adults in the United States,
legislators have responded to different voices in the debate. In
many states, legislation has been introduced to limit the liability
of food manufacturers, sellers, and others in the food distribution
and marketing industry for claims resulting from individuals'
obesity, weight gain, or health conditions related to obesity as a
result of food consumption. Discussion of these bills focuses on:
(1) Industry concerns about who is responsible for healthy choices
in food consumption and the potential for food industry-focused
tort litigation,
(2) Public health concerns about the costs and health impact of
obesity-related chronic conditions such as heart disease, cancer,
stroke and diabetes (the first, second, third and sixth leading
causes of death in the United States), and
(3) Questions about the advisability of limiting access to potential
remedies through the courts.
Industry representatives argue that these bills will protect against
frivolous lawsuits for obesity claims. Trial lawyers contend that
court rules already provide for the early dismissal of frivolous
cases and the award of attorney's fees. In one state, concerns
have been raised that the proposed legislation conflicts with
constitutional provisions that guarantee injured people open
access to the courts.
State and Federal Activity
As of February 16, 2005, bills on this topic had been introduced
in thirty-five (35) states and enacted in thirteen (13) of those
states. The thirteen (13) states that have enacted legislation to
limit civil liability for obesity claims against food vendors and
others in the food industry are Arizona, Colorado, Florida,
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Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Washington State.
Many state-level proposals are modeled on federal legislation
introduced in 2003, either the Commonsense Consumption Act
(S 1428) or the Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act
(HR 339). The chart below details bills introduced in state
legislatures during the 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 legislative
sessions that would provide some degree of immunity from civil
lawsuits against food vendors, distributors, and marketers, and
others in the food industry.
As discussed in this Comment, a widely publicized obesity
lawsuit against McDonald's Corporation was dismissed by a federal
district court in September 2003. On January 26, 2005, the United
States Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit overruled the lower
federal court decision and reinstated portions of the case, ruling that
the plaintiffs should be given an opportunity to show that there was
a link between their obesity and eating foods from McDonald's.
Below is the latest reported action on bills introduced in the
state legislatures as prepared by Amy Winterfeld, Senior Policy
Specialist, Health Program, National Conference of State
Legislatures.
Arizona AZ HB 2220 (2004) (Enacted, signed by the
governor, 4/12/04, Chapter 67)
Provides that food products may not be classified as
defective and unreasonably dangerous for product
liability purposes; and that there is no duty to warn
purchasers that consumption of a food product may
cause health problems if consumed excessively.
Creates an affirmative defense for repeated consump-
tion of a food product as a proximate cause of injury.
California CA AB 173 (New bill for 2005, Introduced 1/27/05
To Assembly Committee on Judiciary)
Would provide civil liability immunity for food
manufacturers, packers, distributors, carriers, sellers or
associations for claims arising from weight gain,
obesity, or a health condition associated with weight
gain or obesity from the long-term consumption of the
food.
CA AB 1909 (2004) (Failed to pass judiciary
committee, 5/4/04) 1
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Would have exempted manufacturers, distributors, or
sellers of food or nonalcoholic beverages intended for
human consumption from civil liability for personal
injury or wrongful death based on an individual's
consumption of food or nonalcoholic beverages
leading to an individual's weight gain, obesity, or a
health condition related to weight gain or obesity.
CO HB 1150 (2004) (Enacted, signed by the
governor, 5/04, Chapter 229)
Creates the Commonsense Consumption Act, limiting
the civil liability of food manufacturers, distributors,
sellers, or retailers for claims resulting from a person's
obesity, weight gain, or health conditions related to
obesity resulting from a person's long-term
consumption of a food or beverage.
CT HB 6156 (New bill for 2005, Introduced 1/24/05,
To Joint Committee on Judiciary)
Would prohibit class action lawsuits for based on
obesity claims.
FL HB 333 (2004) (Enacted, signed by the governor,
5/21/04, Chapter No. 2004-88)
Provides food manufacturers, sellers, and distributors
with immunity from civil liability for personal injury or
wrongful death based upon long-term consumption of
certain foods or nonalcoholic beverages under certain
circumstances; and provide limitations on that
immunity if required nutritional content information
was not provided or if false or misleading information
was provided to the public.
Georgia GA HB 1519 (2004) (Enacted, Act 590, 5/14/04)
Creates the Commonsense Consumption Act,
prohibiting civil lawsuits against food manufacturers,
marketers, distributors, advertisers, sellers, and tradel
associations for claims resulting from a person's
obesity, weight gain, or health conditions related to
weight gain or obesity.
Idaho ID HB 590 (2004) (Enacted , Chaptered 4/2/04,
Chapter 380)
Creates the Commonsense Consumption Act,
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Illinois
Iowa
KS SB 75 (New bill for 2005, Introduced 1/24/05)
Would provide immunity from civil liability for claims
relating to weight _ain or oesit.
KY SB 103 (New bill for 2005, Last action 2/10/05,
Passed Senate, To House)
Would create the Commonsense Consumption Act
excluding food establishments from civil liability for
claims arising out of weight gain or obesity, for claims
pending on the effective date and all claims filed
thereafter regardless of when the claim arose.
KY SB 176 (2004) (Last action, 2/19/04, to Senate
Committee on Judiciary)
Would provide immunity from civil liability to food
manufacturers, packers, distributors, carriers, holders,
sellers, marketers, and advertisers for any claim arising
out of weight gain, obesity, a health condition
prohibiting civil lawsuits against food manufacturers,
marketers, distributors, advertisers, sellers, and trade
associations for claims resulting from a person's
obesity, weight gain, or health conditions related ta
weight gain or obesity. ______
IL HB 3981 (2004) (Enacted, signed by governor,
7/30/04, Public Act No. 93-848)
Creates the Commonsense Consumption Act,
providing that no person shall bring a qualified civil
action in State court against any seller of a food
product. Defines "qualified civil action" to include a
lawsuit against a food seller on a claim of injury
resulting from a person's weight gain, obesity, or any
obesity-related health condition.
IA SB 2186 (2004) (Last action, 3/2/04, in Senate
Committee on Judiciary)
Would limit the civil liability of manufacturers,
distributors, and sellers of food or nonalcoholic
relating to the consumption of food or nonalcoholic
beverage products unless the plaintiff proves that at
the time of sale, the product was not in compliance
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associated with weight gain or obesity, or other
generally known condition caused by or likely to result
from long-term consumption of food.
Louisiana LA HB 518 (2003) (Enacted, signed into law by the
governor 1/30/04, Act 158)
Limits the liability of manufacturers, distributors, and
sellers of food and non-alcoholic beverae products.
Maine ME SB 200 (New bill for 2005, Last action 2/8/05,
Referred by House to Joint Committee on Judiciary
in concurrence)
Would create a defense from liability for persons or
businesses serving food, for claims of obesity of or
excessive weight gain by consumers as a result of their
long-term consumption of food from that person or
entity, with exceptions for altered or misbranded food
items.
Maryland MD HB 15 (New bill for 2005, Last action 2/14/05,
Reported unfavorably from House Committee on
Judiciary.)
Would prohibit civil lawsuits against food sellers based
on a claim of injury or death resulting from a person's
weight gain, obesity, or a related health condition.
MD SB 315 (New bill for 2005, Introduced 1/31/05,
To Senate Committee on Judicial Proceedings)
Would prohibit civil lawsuits against food sellers based
on a claim of injury or death resulting from a person's
ht ain, obesity, or a related health condition.
Michigan MI HB 5809 (2003) (Enacted, signed into law by the
governor 10/7/04, Public Act No. 367)
Provides immunity from civil liability for food manufac-
turers, packers, distributors, carriers, holders, sellers,
marketers, or advertisers or an association that include
one or more of these entities for personal injury or
death arising out of weight gain, obesity, a health
condition associated with weight gain or obesity, ox
other generally known condition allegedly caused by o
allegedly likely to result from long-term consumptior
of food.__ __
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MN HB118 (New bill for 2005, Introduced 1/10/05
To House Committee on Agriculture and Rural
Development)
Would prohibit civil lawsuits against specified persons
for weight gain resulting from the consumption of
certain foods.
MN SB 631 (New bill for 2005, Introduced 1/31/05,
To Senate Committee on Judiciary)
Would prohibit civil lawsuits against certain persons for
weight gain resulting from the consumption of certain
foods.
MS HB 1054 (New bill for 2005, Introduced 1/17/05,
To House Committee on Judiciary)
Would limit the civil liability of food manufacturers andl
sellers for weight gain claims.
MS SB 2910 (2004) (Died in committee 3/9/04)
Would have limited civil lawsuits against food
manufacturers, marketers, distributors, advertisers,
sellers, and trade associations for claims resulting from
a person's obesity, weight gain, or health conditions
related to weight gain or obesity.
MO HB 1115 (2004) (Enacted, signed by governor,
6/25/04)
Creates the Commonsense Consumption Act,
prohibiting civil lawsuits against manufacturers,
distributors, and sellers of food for any claims arising
out of weight gain, obesity, or health conditions
associated with weight gain or obesity. Exceptions to
this prohibition are provided for certain violations of
state and federal law.
NE LB 1046 (2004) (Last action, placed on general
file as amended, 3/11/04)
Would provide limitations on civil liability for specified
claims against manufacturers, distributors, and sellers
of food or nonalcoholic beverages for any claims arising
out of weight gain, obesity, or health conditions
associated with weight gain or obesity based on an
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Nevada NV BDR748 (Bill draft request filed 10/25/04)
Would protect specified food manufacturers and
sellers from "frivolous" lawsuits arising from weight
gain or obesity.
New NH SB 408 (2004) (Failed to pass House, 4/15/04)
Hampshire Would have exempted food sellers, manufacturers,
distributors, packers, advertisers, and marketers from
civil liability for individuals' weight gain, obesity, or
health condition related to obesity.
New Jersey NJ AB 3514 (New bill, Introduced 11/15/04, Last
action 11/22/04, To Assembly Committee on
Judiciary)
Would limit the liability of food producers,
manufacturers, packers, distributors, carriers,
holders, sellers, marketers and advertisers for claims
for weight gain or obesity.
NJ SB 1462 (2004) (Last action, 11/8/04, From
Senate Committee on Judiciary as substituted)
Would prohibit lawsuits against food manufacturers
or sellers on the grounds that food consumption
caused a person's weight gain or obesity.
New Mexico NM HB 553 (New bill for 2005, Introduced 1/27/05,
To House Committee on Judiciary)
Would create the "Right to Eat Enchiladas Act"
eliminating civil liability for health conditions caused
by long-term food consumption.
New York 1 NY AB 11336 (2004) (Last action, 5/28/04, to
Assembly Committee on Codes)
Would define certain lawsuits against manufacturers,
packers, distributors, carriers, holders or sellers of
food as frivolous if alleging injury caused by the use
of food or deceptive trade practices in connection
with a perss p ase or consumption of food.
North Dakota ND HB 1241 (New bill for 2005, Passed House,
Last action, 2/7/05, To Senate Committee on
Judiciary)
Would limit the liability of food producers, manufac-
turers, ackrs, distributors, carriers, holders, sellers,
[VOL. 1 :433
DEFINING THE PROPER ROLE FOR THE TORT SYSTEM
marketers, trade associations, or advertisers foi
claims of injury resulting from weight gain, obesity,
or any health condition related to weight gain.
OH HB 350 (2003) (Last action, 5/26/04, Read on
concurrence. Informally passed.)
Would provide immunity from civil damages for food
manufacturers, sellers, and trade associations fox
claims resulting from a person's obesity or weight
gain or any health condition related to obesity,
weight gain, or cumulative consumption.
OH SB 161 (2003-2004) (Last action, 1/7/04, to
Senate Committee on Agriculture)
Would provide a qualified immunity from civil
damages to a manufacturer or supplier of a food or a
non- alcoholic beverage for a claim of weight gain,
obesity, or a related health condition resulting from
the consumption of the food or non-alcoholic
beverage unless certain circumstances are proven by a
claimant.
Oklahoma OK HB 1554 (New bill for 2005, Last action 2/i/05
To House Committee on Judiciary)
Would create the Commonsense Consumption Act to
prevent "frivolous" lawsuits against manufacturers,
sellers, holders, marketers or advertisers of food
products that comply with applicable statutory andregulatory requirements.
Pennsylvania PA HB 2912 (New bill introduced 10/14/04, Lasi
action 10/14/04, To House Committee on Judiciary)
Would provide for food purveyor civil immunity.
PA SB 1260 (New bill introduced 11/5/04, Lasl
action 11/5/04, To Senate Committee on Judiciary)
Would provide civil immunity from liability for food
purveyors under certain circumstances
PA HB 1986 (2003) (Last action, 9/16/03, to House
Committee on Judiciary)
To create the Personal Responsibility in Food
Consumption Act aimed at preventing lawsuits
deemed frivolous against manufacturers, distributors,




JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
that comply with statutory and regulatory
requirements.
South SC HB3118 (New bill introduced 12/8/04, Last
Carolina action 1/11/05, To House Committee on Judiciary)
Would provide immunity from liability for food
manufacturers, packers, distributors, carriers,
holders, sellers, marketers, and advertisers for claims
relating to weight gain or obesity; with exceptions for
claims based on adulteration or misbranding of food
labels.
South Dakota SD HB 1282 (2004) (Enacted, filed with SD
Secretary of State 3/9/04)
Disallows recovery on civil claims for injury or death
against a manufacturer, seller, trade association,
livestock producer, or retailer resulting from an
individual's weight gain, obesity, or a health
condition resulting from the individual's long-term
consumption of a ualified product.
Tennessee TN HB 3041 (2004) (Substituted on House floor by
S 2379)
TN SB 2379 (2004) (Enacted, chaptered as law
4/30/04, Chapter 570)
Enacts the Commonsense Consumption Act to
prohibit civil lawsuits for damages against
manufacturer, packer, distributor, seller or advertiser
of food claiming weight gain or obesity caused by
long-term consumption of the food unless: (1) The
alleged weight gain is a direct result of violation of
state or federal regulations on food content and
labeling; or (2) The weight gain is a direct result of
intentional violation of state or federal law on
manufacturing, marketing, distribution, advertising,
labeling or selling the food.
Utah UT SB 214 (2004) (Enacted and chaptered as
Chapter 194,3/19/04)
Provides manufacturers, packers, distributors,
carriers, holders, sellers, marketers,
and advertisers of food with immunity from civil
________ liability for obesity and weight gain claims, while
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allowing an exception for food that does not meet
state or federal standards; and requires that any civil
actions commenced plead with particularity the injury
and the proximate cause.
VA HB 1617 (New bill, Prefiled 12/16/04, Last
action 1/28/05, To Senate Committee on Courts of
Justice)
Would prohibit product liability actions against food
manufacturers or sellers for qualified food products,
for claims of injury, potential injury or death
resulting from consumption of a food product and
weight gain, obesity or any health condition related
to weight gain or obesity.
WA SB 6601 (2004) (Enacted and chaptered as
Chapter 139, 3/26/04)
Prohibits lawsuits against manufacturers, packers,
distributors, carriers, holders, sellers, marketers, or
advertisers of food products that comply with
applicable statutory and regulatory requirements for
claims arising out of weight gain, obesity, or health
conditions associated with weight gain or obesity,
caused by or allegedly likely to result from long-term
consumption of food.
WI AB 595 (2003-2004) (Vetoed by the governor,
3/17/04)
WI SB 289 (2003-2004)(Failed to pass pursuant to
Senate Joint Resolution 1, 3/31/04)
Both bills would have created a civil liability
exemption for food manufacturers, marketers,
packers, advertisers, distributors, or sellers for claims
resulting from a person's weight gain or obesity or
health condition related to weight gain or obesity
caused by the consumption of food.
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